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THE  BROOKINGS  PANEL  on  Economic  Activity  first met  twenty-five 
years ago, at a moment of temporary reprieve but ominous portent for 
the  international  monetary  system.  The  Bretton  Woods  system  of 
pegged  but adjustable dollar exchange  rates had permitted the world 
economy  more than two decades of robust growth and generally low in- 
flation. But the structure was starting to unravel. The 1967 devaluation 
of sterling, the 1968 divorce of the market and official prices of gold, and 
the  1969 realignments  of the French franc and German mark had pa- 
pered over localized  tensions  in the Bretton Woods order. At the same 
time, those  events  vividly demonstrated that seemingly  cherished  offi- 
cial commitments  could  easily  succumb  to  speculative  pressures.  By 
March 1973 the Bretton Woods system was history, and dollar exchange 
rates were floating. 
In 1970 a majority of academics and policymakers wanted greater ex- 
change rate flexibility. But most, mindful of Ragnar Nurkse's  critique of 
interwar currency practices, did not go so far as to advocatefloating  dol- 
lar exchange  rates. I Typical proposals favored less extreme departures 
from the existing  arrangement: wider fluctuation margins, smaller and 
I thank Geun Mee Ahn, Kaku Furuya, Luisa Lambertini, and Matthew T. Jones for 
excellent  research  assistance.  The paper has benefited  from the helpful suggestions  of 
Barry Eichengreen, Luisa Lambertini, John Williamson, and participants in the Brookings 
Panel meeting. All errors and opinions are my own. The National Science Foundation, the 
Ford Foundation, and the Center for German and European Studies at the University  of 
California, Berkeley,  provided generous support. 
1.  League of Nations (1944). 
119 120  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
more frequent realignments, or crawling pegs. In practice, however,  the 
"interim" float  initiated  in  1973 accommodated  divergent  policy  re- 
sponses  to the shocks  of the early 1970s, and thus allowed the interna- 
tional community to postpone  indefinitely any comprehensive  redesign 
of currency relations. 
Plans to limit exchange  rate variability resurfaced as the drawbacks 
of floating rates became  more evident.  In the mid-1980s the Group of 
Seven (G-7) industrial countries began to experiment with informal tar- 
get ranges for exchange  rates. More radically, members of the current 
European Union (EU) linked their currencies within the European Mon- 
etary System  (EMS) in 1979 and extended  its Exchange  Rate Mecha- 
nism (ERM), both in membership and in stringency,  as the  1980s pro- 
gressed.  The  long-run impact of  these  experiments  is hard to gauge. 
G-7  cooperation  on  exchange  rates,  although  clearly  productive  on 
some occasions,  has proven sporadic, and at present there is no broad 
international consensus  on how currency relations among major regions 
should evolve.  Much more dramatic has been the failure of the ERM, 
which  was  consigned  by  the  speculative  turbulence  of  1992-93  to  a 
limbo in which some bilateral currency rates float, while others occupy 
? 15 percent bands. To believe  that the Maastricht blueprint for Euro- 
pean monetary union will be operative by 1999 requires a considerable 
leap of faith, although the foundation for eventual  unification is much 
stronger now than it was twenty-five years ago, when the European Eco- 
nomic Community set its sights on a common currency by 1980. 
The Bretton Woods agreement was inspired by the currency disorder 
of the interwar period,  which Nurkse  and many others blamed on the 
lack of a generally accepted  system of rules for trade and currency rela- 
tions.  As conceived  by its founders,  Bretton Woods  was upheld from 
1946 to 1971, roughly a quarter of a century. In 1995 a further quarter of 
a century of international currency experience,  once  more without an 
agreed international framework for monetary  relations,  is behind us. 
That experience  has been eventful and, in certain respects,  disappoint- 
ing. But it is rich in lessons  about exchange rate behavior, about the rela- 
tion between  exchange  rates and the macroeconomy,  about the inter- 
play between  politics  and macroeconomic  policy,  and about the harsh 
discipline that integrated international capital markets impose on would- 
be exchange  rate fixers. This paper reviews  some of those lessons  and 
interprets  their  implications  for  the  redesign  of  the  exchange  rate 
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The Mechanics of Floating Exchange Rates 
The most avid proponents of floating rates before the early 1970s, no- 
tably Milton Friedman and Harry G. Johnson, predicted numerous ben- 
efits from a floating-rate regime.2  Floating rates would offset trend infla- 
tion  differentials,  smoothly  accommodate  equilibrium movements  in 
real exchange rates, liberate monetary policy to pursue domestic goals, 
discourage rather than encourage destabilizing speculation,  ease exter- 
nal constraints,  and thereby discourage the proliferation of official con- 
trols on international trade and payments.  Comparing these  optimistic 
predictions  with actual outcomes  provides  a useful perspective  on re- 
cent international currency experience. 
Exchange  Rates  and Inflation in the Long Run 
Some countries welcomed  the advent of greater exchange  rate flexi- 
bility  in the  1970s, primarily because  it decoupled  domestic  inflation 
from a U.S.  inflation rate which, although relatively moderate in light of 
subsequent  levels,  then  appeared  to  be  dangerously  high.  Insulation 
from foreign price-level  instability is one of the two biggest advantages 
that a flexible exchange  rate provides.  The other, which applies when 
domestic  nominal prices and wages are somewhat rigid, is the exchange 
rate's ability to accommodate  the equilibrating changes in international 
relative prices that otherwise would occur through protracted deflations 
or inflations. 
The theory of (relative) purchasing power parity (PPP) provided the 
theoretical rationale for the belief that floating exchange rates would off- 
set trend inflation differentials. PPP predicts that if E is the price of for- 
eign currency in terms of domestic currency, P the domestic price level, 
and P* the foreign price level, 
(1)  E = P-P*, 
where a hat denotes a percentage change. 
At least since Ricardo, it has been understood that nonmonetary dis- 
turbances and trends can cause long-run departures from PPP. Yet over 
2.  See Friedman (1953) and Johnson (1970). Monetarists were not the only ones sup- 
porting floating rates. A prominent Keynesian  proponent was Meade (1955), who also op- 
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the floating-rate period as a whole,  PPP is a tolerably good description 
of the cross-sectional  behavior  of dollar exchange  rates.  For the G-7 
countries other than the United States,  consider a cross-section  regres- 
sion of rates of currency depreciation against the dollar for 1972-93 on 
the difference between  the domestic  consumer-price  inflation rate and 
the U.S.  inflation rate:3 
/El 993  p  I1993/p 
1_973  (2)  log  E;973 =  a + b log  l993/pl1973  +  ui. 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) yields the estimated equation (with stan- 
dard errors in parentheses): 
a  =  -0.154,  b =  1.115,  R12  =  0.82. 
(0.323)  (0.261) 
The levels  of the independent  and dependent  variables  are plotted  in 
figure 1. PPP regressions based on nominal unit labor costs  in manufac- 
turing rather than CPIs yield virtually identical results. 
For the OECD countries other than developing Turkey (with a 1973- 
93 net price level  increase  of more than 200,000 percent) and Mexico, 
the corresponding regression estimate  iS:4 
a  =  -0.066,  b =  1.011,  R12  =  0.97. 
(0.193)  (0.038) 
The estimated slope coefficient  is close  to the value of unity implied by 
PPP, and the high R2 underscores  how  much of the recent  long-term 
variation in dollar exchange rates can be explained by inflation differen- 
tials. 
Notwithstanding  the explanatory power of relative inflation rates for 
cross-sectional  variation in dollar exchange  rates, there have been sig- 
nificant trends in several real exchange  rates, notably that of the Japa- 
nese yen. The yen's real appreciation against the dollar since  1973-its 
tendency  to appreciate by more than the United  States-Japan  inflation 
differential-is  evident in figure 1, where Japan is far below the 450 diag- 
onal along which relative PPP holds. Figure 2, which plots the Japan-to- 
United States yen price-level  ratio, PjAPAN/Y,E$PuS,  shows that this trend 
3.  Data on CPIs and exchange rates are from Economic Report of the President,  1994, 
tables B-59, B-108, and B-1 10. 
4.  Data on CPIs and exchange  rates are from International Financial  Statistics. Maurice Obstfeld  123 
Figure 1.  Changes in Exchange Rates and Price Levels against the United States, 
1973-93 
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Source:  Economzic Report of the Pr-esident, 1994. 
a.  Depreciation  rates against dollar are log differences  (1993 less  1973) of annual average local currency  prices of 
the dollar. 
b. Inflation rates are log differences  (1993 less  1973) of annual average national consumer  price indexes  divided by 
annual average  U.S.  CPI. 
has been in place at least since the early 1960s and only accelerated after 
the advent of floating rates (with a notable,  albeit temporary, reversal 
during the strong-dollar interlude of the 1980s). 
From a theoretical  viewpoint,  the most persuasive  account  of such 
trends in real exchange  rates is the Balassa-Samuelson  theory,  under 
which the degree of differential productivity  growth in tradable goods 
relative to  nontradable goods  explains  the  rate of  increase  in a cur- 124  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
Figure 2.  Dollar-Yen Real Exchange Rate,  1957-1994a 
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Source: International  Financial  Statistics. 
a. Tics at second  quarter of year shown.  The real dollar-yen exchange  rate shown is Japan's consumer  price index 
divided by the product of the yen-dollar nominal exchange  rate and the U.S.  CPI. A rise is a real appreciation of the 
yen and a real depreciation  of the dollar. The period covered  is  1957:1 to  1994:2 
rency's relative external purchasing power.5 Suppose, for example, that 
productivity growth is the same in U.S.  and Japanese nontradables, but 
is faster in Japanese  tradables than in U.S.  tradables.  Then Japanese 
dollar wages will rise more quickly than American dollar wages, causing 
more rapid increases  in the dollar prices of nontradable goods in Japan 
and, given a common world price of tradables, a more rapid increase in 
Japan's dollar price level  than in that of America.  In a careful study, 
Richard Marston has documented the role of relative (labor) productiv- 
ity growth differentials  in the yen's  real appreciation up to  1983. The 
5.  See  Balassa  (1964) and Samuelson  (1964). Froot and Rogoff (1995) offer a recent 
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Balassa-Samuelson  effect comes through in his data, despite changes in 
the relative price of Japanese and American tradables.6 
A modified version  of equation  2 permits estimation  of the contri- 
bution  of  Balassa-Samuelson  effects  to  the  long-run  cross-sectional 
variation in OECD dollar exchange rates. Let PRDi be a measure of the 
difference between  domestic  and U.S.  productivity growth. On the hy- 
pothesis  that variations in overall productivity  growth are likely to be 
concentrated in tradables and positively  correlated with the national dif- 
ferential  between  productivity  growth  in tradables and nontradables, 
the regression equation 
El  993\  p!993/p97 
(3)  log  Ei:7)  =  a +  b log (F1/F1)  +  cPRDi  +  ui 
should show the role of the Balassa-Samuelson  effect  in creating long- 
run departures from PPP. The OECD reports data on annual average la- 
bor productivity growth over  1973-93 for member countries other than 
Iceland, Luxembourg,  Mexico,  and Turkey.7 Defining PRD, as country 
i labor productivity growth less the U.S.  measure, the OLS estimate of 
equation 3 is (with standard errors in parentheses): 
a =  0.027,  b =  1.021,  c =  -0.071,  R2 =  0.94. 
(0.197)  (0.061)  (0.052) 
The negative estimate of c above,  while not significantly different from 
zero at standard levels,  nonetheless  suggests the presence of a Balassa- 
Samuelson  effect.  The point estimate for c implies that a country with 
average annual labor productivity growth of 1 percent above that of the 
United  States  would have experienced  a 7.1 percent real appreciation 
against the dollar over 1973-93 (an annual real appreciation rate of 0.34 
percent).  The insignificant estimate  of c probably reflects  the general 
finding  of  other  studies,  that  Balassa-Samuelson  effects  show  up 
strongly in some countries (such as Japan) but more weakly in others.8 
6.  Marston (1987). 
7.  See OECD (1994, annex table 58, p. A64). Use of the OECD's total factor productiv- 
ity growth measure results in similar estimates. 
8.  The productivity variable used to estimate equation 3 above  is a crude one.  Asea 
and Mendoza (1994) have carried out a more detailed test,  based on panel data from the 
OECD's intersectoral data base,  which reports input and output data for twenty produc- 
tion sectors within each of fourteen countries over 1970-85. They find that the total factor 
productivity difference between  tradables and nontradables is an important determinant 126  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
The fact of long-run real exchange rate trends, whether due to differ- 
ential intersectoral productivity performance or other factors,  supports 
the move toward exchange  rate flexibility in the early 1970s. Under the 
Bretton Woods  system,  Japan's  acceptance  of a higher inflation rate 
than most other countries in the industrial world allowed a gradual real 
appreciation of the yen (see figure 2). Given Japan's recently  revealed 
preference for lower consumer-price  inflation, however,  the yen's con- 
tinuing trend of real appreciation against the dollar could not have taken 
place at a fixed dollar-yen rate without substantial U.S.  deflation. The 
obvious political infeasibility of that outcome sooner or later would have 
led speculators  to attack any official attempt to fix the exchange  rate, 
just  as  they  did in  1971-73.  By  accommodating  long-run equilibrium 
movements in real exchange rates, floating nominal exchange rates have 
helped liberate countries to pursue their own inflation objectives. 
Exchange  Rates  and Prices  in the Short Run 
The  day-to-day  process  through which  exchange  rate movements 
have eventually  accommodated  inflation and real exchange  rate trends 
has been anything but smooth.  Over relatively  short periods,  PPP has 
failed dramatically. The reason for this bumpy ride is the sluggishness of 
money output prices, which ensures that monetary as well as real distur- 
bances cause nominal and real exchange rates to move closely  with one 
another in the short run. Because international experience  abounds with 
monetary regime shifts, which are as near to controlled experiments  as 
one is likely to come in macroeconomic  data, evidence  on comovements 
between real and nominal exchange rates provides an unparalleled test- 
ing ground for the hypothesis  that prices are sticky in the short run. The 
implications for employment  stability are critical, for if prices continu- 
ally adjusted to clear markets, flexible exchange  rates could provide in- 
sulation from foreign price instability but would not be necessary on sta- 
bilization grounds. 
of their relative price, as the Balassa-Samuelson  model predicts. (In earlier work with the 
same data set, De Gregorio, Giovannini,  and Wolf (1994) find a similar result.) Asea and 
Mendoza, however,  detect only a weak relation between productivity variables and mea- 
sures of the real exchange  rate. Like my own results above,  the Asea-Mendoza  findings 
are suggestive of a Balassa-Samuelson  effect,  but not conclusive. Maurice Obstfeld  127 
If output prices really were as flexible as market-clearing models as- 
sume, then, other things the same, a change in the monetary regime de- 
termining the nominal exchange rate would have no noticeable effect on 
the statistical distribution of the real exchange rate. The data, however, 
do not support this prediction of flexible-price models.  As documented 
most thoroughly by Michael Mussa, industrial countries that move from 
fixed to floating exchange  rate regimes simultaneously  experience  dra- 
matic  rises  in  the  variance  of  quarter-to-quarter real  exchange  rate 
changes.9 Conversely,  when countries  shift from a float to a system  of 
nominal exchange  rate targets,  the short-run variability of the real ex- 
change rate drops.  It is hard to explain this finding-which  applies to 
every postwar exchange-rate regime shift by an industrial country-ex- 
cept by accepting that output prices move sluggishly in the short run, so 
that the greater nominal exchange rate volatility that accompanies a float 
translates into greater real exchange rate volatility. 
Several representative cases illustrate the broader empirical regular- 
ity.  One of the most celebrated  is that of Ireland, which maintained a 
currency board system and a one-to-one exchange rate between the punt 
and the pound sterling from 1927 until 1979. In early 1979 Ireland entered 
the ERM and switched to an ecu peg, effectively  linking the punt to the 
DM instead of the pound. Figure 3 shows  the dramatic increase  in the 
variability of the real punt-pound rate that followed,  while figure 4 shows 
(leaving aside the clearly evident  EMS currency realignments of Sep- 
tember  1979, October  1981, June 1982, March 1983, April and August 
1986, and January 1987) the simultaneous  drop in the variability of the 
real punt-DM rate.  '0 The period of low real and nominal volatility from 
January 1987 (the last EMS realignment before the Maastricht treaty) 
until the February 1993 punt crisis is noteworthy. 
Canada's unusual exchange rate history provides another natural ex- 
periment.  Canada floated its dollar (contrary to Bretton Woods  rules) 
between  1950 and 1962. After returning to the fixed-rate fold, it opted for 
a float once again on June 1, 1970. Figure 5 (based on monthly data) re- 
veals that the fixed-rate period from 1962 to 1970 coincides  with a dra- 
matic drop in the variability of the real Canadian dollar-U. S. dollar ex- 
9.  See Mussa (1986). 
10. During the Bretton Woods era, declared parities against the U.S.  dollar were main- 
tained up to fluctuations of  + I percent. Thus cross rates for nondollar currencies,  such as 
the sterling-DM rate, could fluctuate by ?2 percent. 128  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,  1:1995 
Figure 3.  Punt-Pound Nominal and Real Exchange Rates,  1957-94' 
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Source:  International  Financial  Statistics. 
a. Tics  at second  quarter of  year shown.  The  nominal punt-pound exchange  rate is the price of pounds  in terms 
of the punt, so  that a rise is a nominal depreciation  of the punt and a nominal appreciation  of the pound.  The  real 
punt-pound exchange  rate is the nominal rate times the U.K.  CPI divided by the Irish CPI. A rise is a real depreciation 
of  the punt and a real appreciation  of  the pound.  Log  differences  are plotted  in the  figure. The  period covered  is 
1957:2 to  1994:4. 
change rate. Variability  rises abruptly  in 1970,  precisely when the float 
recommences.  Again, the dominant  role of a floating  nominal  exchange 
rate  in short-run  real  exchange  rate  changes  is striking. 
The behavior  of the French  franc-DM rate  provides a final  example. 
In figure  6, real exchange rate variability  is low prior  to 1973, save for 
the franc devaluations  of 1957  (16.7 percent), 1958  (14.8 percent), and 
1969  (11.1 percent);  the DM revaluations  of 1961  (5.0 percent)  and 1969 Maurice Obstfeld  129 
Figure 4.  Punt-DM Nominal and Real Exchange Rates,  1957-94a 
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Source:  International  Financial  Statistics. 
a. Tics  at second  quarter of year shown.  The nominal punt-DM exchange  rate is the price of DM in terms of the 
punt, so that a rise is a nominal depreciation  of the punt and a nominal appreciation  of the DM.  The real punt-DM 
exchange  rate is the nominal rate times the German CPI divided by the Insh CPI. A nse  is a real depreciation  of the 
punt and a real appreciation  of the  DM.  Log  differences  are plotted  in the figure. The  period covered  is  1957:2 to 
1994:4. 
(9.3 percent); and the period of DM float from May 1971 to the December 
1971 Smithsonian  realignment.  I  l Real  volatility  tracks  the abrupt  drop  in 
nominal  volatility  (apart from  occasional  realignments)  due  to the estab- 
lishment  of the  ERM's  franc-DM  link early  in 1979.  The  wider  o +D  15 per- 
cent  bands,  launched  in August  1993,  have  so far had  a relatively  small 
I 1. For  details,  see Solomon  (1982). 130  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
Figure 5.  Canadian$-U.S.$  Nominal and Real Exchange Rates,  1957-949 
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a. Tics at January  of year shown. The nominal  Canadian  dollar-U.S. dollar  exchange  rate is the price of U.S. 
dollars  in terms of the Canadian  dollar, so that a rise is a nominal  depreciation  of the Canadian  currency  and a 
nominal  appreciation  of the U.S. currency.  The real  Canadian  dollar-U.S. dollar  exchange  rate is the nominal  rate 
times the U.S. CPI  divided  by the Canadian  CPI. A rise is a real  depreciation  of the Canadian  currency  and a real 
appreciation  of the U.S. currency.  Log differences  are plotted  in the figure.  The period  covered  is February  1957  to 
December  1994. 
impact  on  nominal and real variability  within  the  ERM  because  the 
French have tried to shadow the DM. 
In addition to showing that real exchange  rate variability depends on 
the nominal regime, figures 3-6 also make clear how closely  nominal and 
real exchange rates tend to move in the short run. Clearly, greater nomi- Maurice Obstfeld  131 
Figure 6.  Franc-DM Nominal and Real Exchange Rates,  1957-949 
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Source:  International  Financial  Statistics. 
a. Tics  at January of year shown.  The nominal franc-DM exchange  rate is the price of  DM in terms of the franc, 
so  that  a  rise  is  a  nominal  depreciation  of  the  franc  and a  nominal  appreciation  of  the  DM.  The  real franc-DM 
exchange  rate is the nominal rate times the German CPI divided  by the French CPI. A rise is a real depreciation  of 
the franc and a real appreciation of the DM. Log differences  are plotted in the figure. The period covered  is February 
1957 to December  1994. 
nal exchange rate variability  is largely responsible for the increased 
short-run  real exchange rate variability  that occurs under  floating.  This 
outcome could occur in a flexible-price  model with a predominance  of 
real (as opposed to monetary)  disturbances,  as stressed by Alan Stock- 
man,  but such a model  cannot  explain  why the average  amplitude  of real 132  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
shocks  should always rise when nominal exchange  rates are set loose, 
and fall when they are contained. 12 
Studies  of disaggregated  price  data are consistent  with the  sticky- 
price view.  A notable recent study by Charles Engel finds that forecast 
error variances for the relative domestic  prices of different goods  tend 
to be far below  those for relative domestic  and foreign prices of a very 
similar good. 13 Engel examines two data sets, one consisting of monthly 
1973-90 energy, food,  services,  and shelter CPIs for the G-7 countries 
less the United Kingdom; the other, of thirty-four monthly 1973-90 con- 
sumer price subindexes for the United States and Canada. (In the latter 
data set,  only a few,  generally homogeneous  products violate the gen- 
eral pattern that Engel finds.) The prices that consumers  pay for nomi- 
nally tradable goods  contain a sizable nontradable component,  but the 
reported discrepancies  seem too large to be explained away through the 
bundling of tradables and nontradables at the retail level. 
A follow-up  paper by Charles Engel and John Rogers uses  monthly 
1978-93  CPI data for fourteen  U.S.  and Canadian cities  and fourteen 
consumer expenditure categories to study the effect of distance (implic- 
itly, of transport costs) on price arbitrage for similar commodities.  4 Dis- 
tance between  cities is generally significant for relative price variation, 
but distance between an American and a Canadian city appears to have 
a vastly  more  important effect  on  relative  prices  than does  distance 
between two cities in the same country. This finding is unlikely to be en- 
tirely  due  to  the  relatively  low  trade barriers separating the  United 
States and Canada, but it can be explained by the hypothesis  of nominal 
exchange rate variability coupled with sticky consumer prices. 
As  Johnson  emphasized  in making his  case  for floating rates,  the 
abandonment of fixed exchange  rate targets cannot enhance the effec- 
tiveness  of  monetary  policy  unless  there  is  substantial  stickiness  of 
domestic  prices  and wages.  Early  on,  Rudiger Dornbusch  and  Paul 
Krugman qualified Johnson's  optimism  by  showing  how  the respon- 
siveness  of  domestic  inflation to  changes  in a floating exchange  rate 
might reduce  the  impact  of  monetary  policy  on  output  and employ- 
ment. 5  However,  economies  with  moderate  inflation and diversified 
12.  See Stockman (1987). 
13.  Engel (1993). 
14.  Engel and Rogers (1995). 
15.  Dornbusch and Krugman (1976). The point was turned on its head by Sachs (1985), Maurice Obstfeld  133 
production capabilities still retain some latitude for effective  discretion- 
ary  monetary  policy  actions,  especially  in  response  to  unexpected 
events.  Britain's monetary relaxation following its withdrawal from the 
ERM in September 1992 provides a textbook example of how monetary 
policy  works  in sticky-price  models  as  different  as the  1960s IS-LM 
model of Robert Mundell and Marcus Fleming, and the 1990s intertem- 
poral New Keynesian  model proposed by Kenneth Rogoff and myself. 16 
Table 1 shows that Britain, having entered the ERM in October 1990, 
subsequently  enjoyed  lower  inflation and  interest  rates  but  suffered 
from negative  output growth,  falling investment,  and growing  unem- 
ployment.  Most  observers  agreed  that  the  pound  was  overvalued 
against the DM, in the sense that, without a currency realignment, only 
a period of below-German  inflation could restore a real exchange  rate 
consistent  with employment  at the natural rate. This was the backdrop 
for  the  speculative  attack  of  September  16,  1992,  which  led  to  the 
pound's flotation. 
The ERM crisis freed the British government to lower interest rates. 
Lower  interest rates and sterling's depreciation  have,  in turn, spurred 
economic  recovery.  By 1994, output and investment  were growing, un- 
employment was falling, the current account deficit was below  1 percent 
of GDP, and inflation remained low. The sharp fall in relative British unit 
labor cost after 1992 is partly a result of productivity gains. But most of 
it must be ascribed to the parallel depreciation of the pound, which low- 
ered U.K.  nominal wages in terms of foreign currencies,  increasing the 
economy's  competitiveness. 
The  British  case  illustrates  the  second  powerful  argument for ex- 
change rate flexibility: the potential for exchange  rate adjustments  to 
bring about at a stroke equilibrating relative price changes  that other- 
wise  would  require politically  unacceptable  and economically  costly 
stretches of unemployment (in cases  where real depreciation is needed) 
or inflation (in cases  where real appreciation is needed).  From this per- 
spective,  the EMS currency realignments of 1992-93 served the individ- 
ual interests of the member countries,  if not the group's political goal of 
a smooth transition to monetary union. 
who argued that dollar appreciation had helped reduce the sacrifice ratio associated  with 
the U.S.  disinflation of the early 1980s. 
16.  See Mundell (1968), Fleming (1962), and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995a). a  0c)  -:t  tf -: 
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Despite  the high short-run correlation between  nominal and real ex- 
change rate changes,  there is increasing  evidence  that shocks  to real 
exchange rates, on average, decay over time. This may explain the find- 
ing that, over  the recent  float as a whole,  PPP is a good  guide to the 
cross-sectional  evolution  of  exchange  rates.  Jeffrey  Frankel  and 
Andrew Rose,  for example,  analyze  a post-1973 panel of annual data 
from 150 countries and conclude  that the average half-life of deviations 
from  PPP  (once  time  trends  in real exchange  rates  are  removed)  is 
around four years. 17 
The Volatility of Floating  Exchange  Rates 
The  pre-1973 advocates  of  floating rates  seriously  underestimated 
their volatility. Most of them believed that stabilizing speculation would 
ensure  the  smooth  and gradual adjustment of exchange  rates to eco- 
nomic shocks,  and discounted  Nurkse's  grave charge against interwar 
floating rates, that they often were driven by self-fulfilling expectations 
rather than by equilibrating capital flows. Thus Johnson wrote: 
A freely  flexible  exchange  rate  would  tend  to remain  constant  so long  as underly- 
ing economic conditions  (including  governmental  policies) remained  constant; 
random  deviations  from  the equilibrium  level would be limited  by the activities 
of private  speculators,  who would  step in to buy  foreign  exchange  when  its price 
fell (the currency  appreciated  in terms  of currencies)  and  to sell it when  its price 
rose (the currency  depreciated  in terms  of foreign  currencies). 
On the other hand, if economic changes or policy changes occurred that 
under  a fixed exchange rate would produce  a balance-of-payments  surplus  or 
deficit, and, ultimately  a need for policy changes, the flexible exchange rate 
would  gradually  either  appreciate  or depreciate  as required  to preserve  equilib- 
rium.  The movement  of the rate would be facilitated  and smoothed  by the ac- 
tions of private  speculators,  on the basis of their  reading  of current  and  prospec- 
tive economic  and  policy developments.  18 
One of the most important realizations after the onset of floating has 
been that an exchange  rate is the relative price of two assets  (national 
monies) and that, in an environment of international capital mobility, it 
17.  See Frankel and Rose (1995a), whose panel estimates of the PPP relationship after 
1973 are similar to the pure cross-sectional  estimates  reported above.  Wei and Parsley 
(1995) estimate a similar half-life based on a panel of post-1973 data from twelve  tradable 
sectors in fourteen OECD countries. 
18. Johnson (1970, p. 99). 136  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1995 
is determined  by  the  same principles  that govern  the prices  of  other 
assets,  such as stocks,  storable commodities,  and long-term bonds.'9 
Exchange  rates therefore  depend  on potentially  volatile  expectations 
about the future as well  as on current economic  conditions.  They  re- 
spond  immediately  and possibly  sharply  to  actual  or rumored news 
about  the fundamentals-money  supplies,  output  levels,  current ac- 
counts,  fiscal deficits,  and so on-determining  currency values.  Thus, 
the jagged floating exchange rate changes in figures 3-6,  qualitatively at 
least, are to be expected. 
Indeed, theorists of the mid- 1970s were able to explain how exchange 
rates might be more volatile than fundamentals,  even in a world of effi- 
cient,  rational  speculators.  The  overshooting  theory  associated  with 
Dornbusch  linked volatility  to the rapid adjustment of exchange  rates 
when output prices are sticky: assuming parity in the expected  nominal 
returns on bonds denominated in different currencies, if domestic mone- 
tary expansion lowers the interest rate at home, the home currency must 
depreciate beyond its eventual level to create the expectation of appreci- 
ation  that  interest  parity  requires.20 A  second  explanation,  due  to 
Mussa,  was based on the magnification  effect.2' Johnson's  contention 
that rational speculators smooth the path of the exchange rate is correct 
when the exchange rate is a discounted  average of expected  fundamen- 
tals that are statistically  stationary random variables.  In that case,  ex- 
change rate innovations are less variable than innovations in the funda- 
mentals  because  the  exchange  rate change  is  a weighted  average  of 
effects that decay over time. But if the fundamentals contain unit roots, 
exchange rate innovations rationally may be as variable or more variable 
than innovations in the fundamentals.22 On either theory, high volatility, 
per se, need not be evidence  of irrational speculation. 
19.  The asset-price  view  of exchange  rates is reviewed  by Dornbusch and Krugman 
(1976). Seminal papers taking this approach include Black (1973) and several of the contri- 
butions in the landmark issue  of the Scandinavian  Journal of Economics  (Herin,  Lind- 
beck,  and Myhrman, 1976). McKinnon's  (1969) and Branson's (1970) earlier work on the 
stock-equilibrium approach to international capital flows helped set the stage for the asset 
approach to exchange rates. 
20.  Dornbusch (1976). 
21.  See Mussa (1976). Meese and Singleton (1983) formalize the magnification effect. 
22.  Exactly  this reasoning underlies the Deaton paradox in tests of the permanent in- 
come hypothesis  of consumption.  More generally, Hart and Kreps (1986) show that ratio- 
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These sanguine rationalizations of volatility were undermined by the 
growing realization that many short-run exchange  rate shifts were not 
easily  explicable,  even  after the fact,  by observed  changes  in the sup- 
posed fundamentals underlying standard models of exchange rate deter- 
mination. Perhaps constancy  of the fundamentals would not guarantee 
constancy  of exchange  rates after all. The limited understanding of ac- 
tual industrial-country exchange rate movements was driven home most 
forcefully  by Richard Meese  and Kenneth Rogoff.23 They showed  that 
standard structural exchange  rate models  had less  forecasting  power 
than a naive random walk model, even when their forecasts  were based 
on actual (rather than predicted) future values of fundamental variables. 
The only exception  to this result occurred at horizons of a year or more, 
where  structural models  sometimes  outperformed  the  random walk. 
Comparisons of fixed and floating exchange rate regimes seemingly con- 
firm this message with the conclusion  that higher (real and nominal) ex- 
change rate volatility is the only  difference: the variabilities of standard 
fundamentals such as money  supplies and outputs do not appear to di- 
verge  systematically  across  regimes.24 I will suggest  in passing below 
reasons to be cautious about embracing this conclusion,  aside from the 
obvious  one that the exchange  rate variability rationally warranted by 
the variability of a fundamental series is quite sensitive to subtle parame- 
ter differences in the neighborhood of a unit root. 
A  major empirical  problem  has  been  to  explain  why  forward  ex- 
change  premia  are  consistently  negatively  correlated  with  future 
changes  in spot rates. Models  of rational risk-averse  speculation  typi- 
cally cannot generate risk premia variable enough to explain this finding, 
while models assuming infrequent dramatic policy shifts (so-called peso 
problems) or learning go only part of the way in replicating observed re- 
lations  between  spot  and forward  rates.25 Using  survey  data on  ex- 
change rate forecasts,  Jeffrey Frankel and Kenneth Froot show that re- 
aptly put it, speculators do not buy when prices are low and sell when they are high: rather, 
ihey  buy when prices are expected  to rise and sell when they are expected  to fall. This 
activity may, but need not, stabilize prices. 
23.  See Meese and Rogoff (1983a, 1983b). 
24.  See,  for example,  Baxter and Stockman (1989) who focus  on real variables,  and 
Flood and Rose (1993) who consider nominal as well as real variables. 
25.  Lewis (1995) gives a comprehensive  survey. 138  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
ported expectations  are widely dispersed and that median forecasts  are 
biased predictors.  Although they  suggest  that the survey expectations 
are in fact  stabilizing  rather than destabilizing,  their results,  coupled 
with the dismal predictive  performance of the forward rate, challenge 
the view  that exchange  rate movements  are usually  well  grounded in 
fundamentals.26 
These  largely negative findings have had a major impact both on ex- 
change rate research and on views toward exchange rate policy.  Frankel 
and Rose conclude  in a recent survey that "we, like much of the profes- 
sion,  are doubtful of the  value  of further time-series  modeling  of ex- 
change  rates  at  high  or  medium  frequencies  using  macroeconomic 
models."27 Some  have  drawn the policy  conclusion  that much of the 
variance of industrial-country exchange  rates is unrelated to economic 
conditions  or policy  actions,  and that governments  therefore can limit 
volatility for free. Recent economic  models of profitable noise trading in 
asset markets reinforce that view.28 
If warranted, these conclusions  suggest that not only many short-run 
exchange  rate movements,  but also some of the medium-term swings, 
simply are not susceptible  to explanation  in terms of available models. 
In  addition  to  displaying  inexplicable,  temporary  day-to-day  move- 
ments,  the exchange  rate may become  substantially "misaligned" over 
longer  periods,  as  argued  by  John  Williamson,  through  cumulative 
changes that are difficult to explain either quantitatively or qualitatively 
in terms of fundamentals.29 
"Exhibit A" in the case for irrational exchange rate misalignment has 
long been the dollar's massive real appreciation between  1980 and 1985, 
which amounted to somewhere  between  40 and 60 percent,  depending 
on the measure used. (The yen's  sharp real appreciation in recent years 
may prove to be "exhibit B.") Reasonable observers differ, however,  as 
to whether important shifts in fundamental factors occurring at the same 
time (the Volcker  disinflation,  the Reagan fiscal expansion,  and some 
26.  See  Frankel and Froot (1987). The finding of bias,  given  the finite data sample, 
again could be related to peso-problems  or learning effects. 
27.  Frankel and Rose (1995b). 
28.  However,  Romer (1993) shows that asset prices may move sharply in the absence 
of news about fundamentals even when all traders behave rationally. Romer's model also 
has implications for interpreting the empirical evidence  on sterilized foreign exchange  in- 
tervention,  which is examined below. 
29.  Williamson (1985). Maurice  Obstfeld  139 
fiscal contraction outside the United States) justified so sharp a rise. The 
answers range from qualified yes (for example,  Branson) to categorical 
no (for example,  Williamson),  with many taking an agnostic  stance.30 
Without a successful  model of exchange rates, it has been difficult to re- 
solve such disagreements. 
Problems  in Modeling  Exchange  Rates 
Just as theorists  of the early 1970s were somewhat  surprised by the 
asset-price character of exchange  rate movements,  empirical research- 
ers bent on estimating structural time-series exchange rate models were 
unexpectedly  confounded,  after some  initial successes,  by the data's 
failure to stick to stable statistical patterns. They might have been less 
surprised if they had paid greater attention to the work going on in empir- 
ical finance. Excessive  volatility has been the usual verdict of attempts 
to rationalize movements  in other assets'  prices in terms of small sets of 
plausible fundamentals. Industrial-country exchange rates actually tend 
to be less volatile than many other asset and commodity prices, but the 
difficulties involved in empirical exchange rate modeling are an order of 
magnitude greater than those that arise in thinking about capital assets.31 
In studying stock prices,  for example,  dividends  and interest rates are 
clearly among the main fundamentals,  but those  underlying exchange 
rates are more diverse and harder to quantify. Indeed, the theory most 
fundamental to exchange rate models, the theory of money demand, has 
always  been  one  of the more problematic  topics  in macroeconomics, 
and standard formulations have become  increasingly unsatisfactory  as 
financial innovation has proceeded. 
The money  supply,  for example,  plays  a central role in all serious 
models.  Yet,  measuring  a  real-world  counterpart  of  that  variable- 
which  usually  is modeled  as exogenous-is  far from straightforward. 
Consider a world in which supply and demand for a particular monetary 
aggregate are both functions  of the nominal interest rate, upward- and 
downward-sloping respectively.  An outward shift of the supply function 
(an exogenous  increase in money supply) may have a large effect on the 
30.  See Branson (1986) and Williamson (1993). For views from around the time of the 
dollar's peak (the first quarter of 1985), see Frankel (1985) and Sachs (1985). 
31.  See Frenkel and Mussa (1980), Bergstrand (1983), and Dornbusch (1986). 140  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
interest rate, and hence on the exchange rate, with only a minimal effect 
on the measured monetary aggregate. An upward shift in demand will 
cause the monetary aggregate to rise, perhaps sharply, as the currency 
appreciates. Anyone who takes an endogenous  monetary aggregate like 
MI or M2 as the counterpart of the model's  monetary fundamental is 
probably  doomed  to  be  unable  to  find a stable  relationship  between 
money and the exchange rate. For example,  the U .S. monetary squeeze 
of the early  1980s, which promoted a sharp appreciation of the dollar, 
shows up strongly in interest rates, but rather weakly in broader mone- 
tary aggregates. 
A relatively new literature on measuring the exogenous  component of 
monetary policy has addressed exchange  rate effects,  with encouraging 
results.  Martin Eichenbaum  and Charles  Evans  examine  exogenous 
components of the ratio of nonborrowed to total reserves and the federal 
funds'  rate (defined as components  orthogonal to contemporaneous  vari- 
ables supposedly  in the Federal Reserve  Board's monetary policy reac- 
tion function). They also consider the Romer-Romer index of monetary 
policy stance. In all cases they find that expansionary monetary innova- 
tions lead to dollar depreciation in vector autoregressive  (VAR) models, 
and that monetary shocks explain an important fraction of the variance 
of the dollar's foreign value.32  Richard Clarida and Jordi Gali estimate a 
three-equation VAR system  based on the model in my 1985 Brookings 
paper and identify  aggregate demand  shocks,  monetary  shocks,  and 
supply shocks  through a priori long-run restrictions.  They find an even 
larger explanatory  role for monetary shocks  than do Eichenbaum  and 
Evans  (at least for the dollar-yen and dollar-DM exchange  rates),  and 
also find that monetary and demand shocks generate impulse-response 
functions  consistent  with  the  predictions  of  models  in the  Mundell- 
Fleming class.33 Of course,  the identifying assumptions  underlying the 
VAR results are open to discussion  and do have a material effect on the 
computed impulse responses  to what is defined as a monetary shock.34 
32.  See  Eichenbaum  and  Evans  (1995).  The  Romer-Romer  index  is  described  in 
Romer and Romer (1989). Eichenbaum and Evans also find that their orthogonalized mea- 
sures of U.S.  monetary policy are more variable after 1973 than under the Bretton Woods 
system. 
33.  See Clarida and Gali (1994). 
34.  Kim and Roubini  (1995) propose  one  more  scheme  for identifying  exogenous 
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Another  reason  to  resist  premature despair  is  the  increasing  evi- 
dence,  foreshadowed  by some of Meese  and Rogoff's  original findings, 
that structural exchange rate models do outperform the random walk at 
long horizons.35 Thus although short-run fluctuations  remain mysteri- 
ous,  the theory  is not without  predictive  content-a  point consistent 
with the evidence  on long-run PPP presented earlier. 
Only continued research on the general-equilibrium modeling of ex- 
change rates can help to narrow economists'  basic disagreements about 
the causes  of exchange  rate movements.  Exchange  rates display a de- 
gree of short-term volatility that has yet to be explained,  but macroeco- 
nomic  exchange  rate  models  based  on  standard fundamentals  have 
proven quite helpful in understanding the broad, qualitative outlines of 
exchange rate movements  over the medium to long term. 
Costs  of Exchange  Rate  Volatility 
Whether due to poorly functioning markets or unpredictable policies, 
exchange rate volatility has proven costly.  However,  quantification and 
even  identification of many of the costs  continue  to elude researchers. 
Pending  the  development  of  realistic  general-equilibrium  models  in 
which the welfare effects  of exchange  rate volatility  can be evaluated 
rigorously, most discussion  of its costs remains anecdotal. 
Nurkse argued that interwar exchange  rate instability contributed to 
shrinking world trade, and much empirical analysis has followed his lead 
by  seeking  statistical  estimates  of  any  trade-reducing  effects  of  ex- 
change rate uncertainty.  Pure time-series  studies of these  effects  have 
yielded no definitive conclusions. 
Cross-sectional  studies do, however,  point to a negative association 
between measures of trade and real exchange rate variability. In a study 
supply changes on exchange  rates. While Eichenbaum and Evans find a strong violation 
of uncovered interest parity after money shocks, in the sense that interest differentials mis- 
predict the subsequent  evolution  of the exchange  rate,  Kim and Roubini find a pattern 
more consistent  with interest parity. If money  shocks  are overwhelmingly  dominant, the 
direct evidence  showing that interest differentials usually do mispredict subsequent  ex- 
change rate movements  would support the Eichenbaum-Evans  identification over that of 
Kim and Roubini. But it is far from clear that monetary shocks have been dominant. 
35.  For recent analyses,  see Chinn and Meese (1995) and Mark (1995). 142  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
of bilateral trade flows among ten industrial countries,  Paul De Grauwe 
finds a significant negative association  between  year-to-year variability 
in bilateral nominal and real exchange  rates and the growth of bilateral 
trade. These  estimates  control for output growth and for the existence 
of preferential trading relationships.  Measures  of  short-term (month- 
to-month  or  quarter-to-quarter)  volatility  are  not  significant  in  De 
Grauwe's  trade-growth equations,  a finding he ascribes  to the greater 
difficulty of hedging longer-term risks due to the possibility of persistent 
misalignment.36 
Using data from a larger set of countries,  Jeffrey Frankel and Shang- 
Jin Wei find a consistently  significant but small negative effect of month- 
to-month real exchange  rate variability on the level  of trade after con- 
trolling for other determinants of trade suggested  by a gravity model.37 
Barry Eichengreen  and Douglas  Irwin apply similar techniques  to the 
interwar period, on which Nurkse based his analysis,  reporting a nega- 
tive relation between month-to-month nominal volatility and 1928 trade 
levels  that  is  statistically  significant  but  "economically  unimportant 
compared with other factors."38 
A problem in interpreting these  studies,  as De Grauwe himself em- 
phasizes,  is  that there is  no  theoretical  presumption  that greater ex- 
change rate uncertainty should reduce trade levels.  The welfare effects 
of any observed  reductions  in trade levels  are therefore difficult to as- 
sess-and  this holds equally with respect to trade growth rates. The ob- 
servation that trade and capital movements  can be substitutes  suggests 
that countries  can hedge  even  longer-term misalignment  risks by dis- 
persing production facilities  abroad. This diversification  might reduce 
measured trade merchandise  flows,  which  are effectively  replaced by 
trade in factor services,  without any important fall in production  effi- 
ciency.  Simultaneity bias may affect the cross-sectional  studies.  When 
two countries have a high level of bilateral trade, relatively  small bilat- 
eral  real  exchange  rate  adjustments  suffice  to  offset  asymmetrical 
36.  De Grauwe (1988). De Grauwe's regressions consider trade growth over the years 
1960-69 and 1973-84. 
37.  Frankel and Wei (1993). Gravity models explain bilateral trade flows in terms of 
geographical distance, measures of country size, and per capita incomes.  Frankel and Wei 
report cross-section  regressions for 1980, 1985, and 1990. 
38.  Eichengreen and Irwin (1995, p. 20). For the two other years Eichengreen and Ir- 
win examine,  1935 and 1938, the association  between  trade and nominal volatility,  while 
still negative, is statistically insignificant. Maurice Obstfeld  143 
shocks.  Thus,  the  observed  association  between  trade and volatility 
could reflect the effect  of trade on volatility,  not the effect of volatility 
on trade.39 
De Grauwe attributes his finding of a negative  association  between 
trade growth and exchange  rate volatility  to a tendency  for misaligned 
exchange  rates to induce a protectionist  trade response.  Writing in the 
early  1980s, C. Fred Bergsten  enunciated  the view  that real exchange 
rate movements  drive protectionism.40 The  U.S.  Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness  Act of 1988, which originated in the fallout of the dol- 
lar's  1980-85  real appreciation,  illustrates  the general point.  Edward 
Leamer, analyzing 1978 output data on nineteen industries in fifteen in- 
dustrial countries, observes that the cross-sectional  correlation of tariffs 
and output tends to be negative,  conditional  on other output determi- 
nants.  He attributes this to a positive  effect  of imports on the demand 
for protection. Daniel Trefler shows that for a 1983 cross-section  of U.S. 
manufacturing industries,  the fraction  of  imports  subject to  nontariff 
barriers is positively related to a measure of import penetration.41  To the 
extent  that increases  in imports are associated  with real appreciations, 
this evidence  supports Bergsten's  thesis.  It has puzzled  some that pro- 
tectionist  lobbying  by  importers  is  not  discouraged  by the  exchange 
rate's tendency  under a float to appreciate when across-the-board  pro- 
tection is granted. But the appreciation reflects a congestion  externality 
that individual importers ignore. In contrast,  each export industry has 
an incentive  to free  ride on other exporters'  lobbying efforts  for free 
trade. 
Nonetheless,  despite the pressures for protection associated with dra- 
matic medium-term exchange  rate oscillations,  the GATT process  of 
multilateral trade liberalization has continued over the floating rate era, 
drawing in progressively  more countries and categories of trade. 
Yet another concern  is that even  a transitory currency depreciation 
might feed quickly into wages and prices with effects persistent enough 
to induce later monetary accommodation  by policy authorities. For this 
39.  Frankel and Wei (1993) and Eichengreen  and Irwin (1995) attempt to correct for 
simultaneity bias.  Exchange  rate volatility  could  have adverse  economic  effects  by de- 
pressing investment.  For alternative theoretical and empirical approaches,  see Campa and 
Goldberg (1995) and Huizinga (1994), who find significant but economically  small effects. 
40.  See Bergsten (1982). Dornbusch and Frankel (1987) offer a comprehensive  and bal- 
anced, if somewhat dated, evaluation. 
41.  See Leamer (1988) and Trefler (1993). 144  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
mechanism  to impart a definite inflationary bias to policy,  wages  and 
prices must exhibit greater inflexibility with respect to downward than 
upward movements.  Attempts to detect such a ratchet effect of volatility 
on mean inflation have generally failed.42 
Taken together,  the evidence  points to very small costs  from short- 
term, transitory exchange  rate changes,  perhaps  thanks to the ready 
availability of financial hedging instruments.  The costs  of longer-term 
misalignments  seem  much more  substantial.  The effects  are least  se- 
vere, in principle, for owners of physical capital, who have the opportu- 
nity  to  diversify  their  capital  holdings  internationally  and otherwise 
hedge against unexpected exchange rate shocks. The effects are very se- 
vere for owners of sector-specific  human capital, who cannot trade their 
future wage income on forward markets, and face job loss as a result of 
sharp protracted  shifts  in their employers'  international competitive- 
ness. Partial hedges are conceivable-a  Detroit auto worker could main- 
tain a position in yen put options to soften the blow of a layoff if the dol- 
lar were to appreciate unexpectedly-but  few have enough wealth,  or 
can borrow enough, to insure much of their human capital in that way. 
The adverse impact of sustained high-amplitude swings in real exchange 
rates on liquidity-constrained owners of human capital has not received 
sufficient empirical attention.4 
The External Constraint under Floating  Rates 
A major advantage claimed for floating rates as the Bretton Woods 
system neared its end was that they would ease the external constraints 
of deficit countries. This they have done, but in part through unexpected 
channels. 
42.  See Goldstein (1984, pp. 16-17) for a review. 
43.  McKinnon (1988) has emphasized how volatility costs associated  with incomplete 
asset markets impinge on international trade and investment  decisions.  The point here is 
that the effects  on workers are likely to be even more significant. The incompleteness  of 
asset  markets, however,  also provides  one of the most important arguments in favor  of 
exchange rate flexibility. When the exchange rate is fixed, a fall in demand for a country's 
exports causes unemployment concentrated in the export sector. A currency depreciation 
can be viewed as a domestic  insurance mechanism that spreads the shock's  effect across 
the entire population. What would otherwise be a localized  shock borne primarily by un- 
employed factors in the export sector is converted into a terms-of-trade deterioration that 
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Under Bretton Woods,  a country's main international obligation was 
to defend its currency's  parity against the dollar; to comply,  govern- 
ments initially needed to hold sufficient stocks  of gold reserves  or for- 
eign currencies convertible into dollars. Balance-of-payments  deficits- 
positive  totals of the current account  deficit and of the net nonofficial 
capital account deficit-depleted  foreign reserves,  threatening the sus- 
tainability of a parity, and therefore necessitated  defensive policies such 
as higher interest  rates,  spending cuts,  and direct payments  controls. 
Advocates  of floating rates argued that they would obviate the use of of- 
ficial reserves  for intervention  purposes,  allowing the governments  of 
deficit countries  to eschew  controls  and turn macroeconomic  policies 
toward domestic  stabilization. Freely floating exchange rates would ad- 
just automatically to bring net capital inflows into line with the current 
account deficit. 
As international and domestic  capital markets grew in depth and so- 
phistication  during the  1960s,  the  balance-of-payments  definition  of 
external  balance  became  increasingly  outmoded.  Even  without  large 
international reserve  holdings,  it became  increasingly feasible for gov- 
ernments to defend a parity through sales of domestic rather than foreign 
securities.  With high capital mobility,  a sale of domestic  securities  at- 
tracts a private capital inflow by placing upward pressure on domestic 
interest rates, and thereby raises official reserves.  Equivalently,  higher 
capital mobility brings increasing opportunities for governments to bor- 
row foreign currencies in world capital markets. 
In the years since the end of Bretton Woods, many governments have 
dismantled  their  national  controls  over  international  capital  move- 
ments. For some countries,  such as the United States and Germany, the 
shift to floating facilitated liberalization. Most industrial countries and a 
growing  number of  developing  countries  participate  in an integrated 
world capital market within which interest-rate arbitrage is highly effi- 
cient.44 As  a result,  the  technical  constraint  on defending  a fixed ex- 
change rate is the government' s overall solvency  constraint (at world in- 
terest  rates),  rather than  the  more  stringent  constraint  that  it  hold 
positive foreign reserves.45 Provided there are sufficient fiscal resources 
44.  See the evidence  presented by Marston (1993). 
45.  The argument is elaborated in Obstfeld (1993). It implies that the interwar and Bret- 
ton Woods  eras' concern  over  international liquidity now is largely irrelevant as far as 
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to repurchase the monetary base-resources  that need not take the form 
of foreign reserves-the  government  has the technical  ability to main- 
tain any desired exchange rate peg. The evolution of the Mexican crisis 
following the peso's  initial devaluation in December  1994 illustrates this 
point: the government's  initial difficulty in stabilizing the peso,  even at 
sharply devalued levels,  was, at bottom, a fiscal problem stemming from 
the fear that high interest  charges  for rolling over  government  debts 
would necessitate  wholesale  inflationary finance. 
The Current Account 
The  expansion  of  international  capital  markets  after  1973 also  in- 
creased the scope for current account imbalances,  that is, divergences 
between  national saving and domestic  investment  rates.  Many devel- 
oping, countries  borrowed  heavily  throughout  the  1970s,  maintaining 
growth at the expense  of rising foreign debt. The worldwide  recession 
and high interest rates of the early 1980s brought on a sharp contraction 
in lending to developing countries that eased only at the start of the pres- 
ent decade. 
Figure 7 presents  some  evidence  on industrial-country ratios of the 
current account to GDP. For Canada, Italy, and Japan, it is hard to dis- 
cern any change in the average absolute size or variability of imbalances 
after 1973. But for Germany, Sweden,  the United Kingdom, the United 
States and, less markedly, for France, the amplitude of current account 
fluctuations  seems  to rise during the floating rate era. Here is one  ex- 
change rate fundamental whose  behavior does  change with the advent 
of floating. More broadly, the rise in international capital mobility after 
Bretton Woods  is an objective  change that one would expect  to raise 
both current-account  and exchange  rate volatility,  given  other funda- 
mentals. 
There remains controversy  about the precise mechanisms generating 
current account imbalances among industrial countries during the float- 
ing-rate era.  An  important strand of  theoretical  work  starting in the 
1970s, the intertemporal approach  to the current account,  models  the 
saving-investment  balance as the outcome  of forward-looking  optimal 
decisions  by households  and firms. While separate empirical work on 
consumption  and investment  behavior  calls  into  question  the  simple 
constructs  underlying  rudimentary versions  of  the  intertemporal  ap- Maurice Obstfeld  147 
proach, even these models  have surprising explanatory power for sev- 
eral countries. Serious empirical work on the subject is still at a compar- 
atively  early stage,  however,  and the empirical intertemporal models 
that have been tested so far will need extensive  elaboration before they 
can be helpful for policy analysis.46 
A key virtue of the intertemporal approach is that it sheds new light 
on the functions of current account imbalances. Just as countries gain in 
the aggregate from intratemporal trade (a fact that leads almost all econ- 
omists to oppose  trade restrictions),  they also can gain in the aggregate 
from intertemporal trade, the trade of consumption  over time through 
international lending and borrowing. In principle, there is no more rea- 
son for governments  to seek small current account imbalances than to 
seek low levels of gross imports when trade is balanced. 
That governments  have often  sought to limit gross imports through 
protection is one clue as to why large current account imbalances can be 
politically problematic,  and especially  so under floating rates: they are 
often  associated  with  steep  swings  in real exchange  rates that create 
angry,  sometimes  well-organized,  losers.  Along with current account 
ratios,  figure 7 shows  real effective  exchange  rate indexes  from  1964, 
based on ratios of unit labor costs. 
From an economic  perspective,  the most  salient difficulty for stan- 
dard models  of intertemporal trade is the mechanism  enforcing repay- 
ment today for resources that were lent yesterday.47 But there are other 
real-world problems; for example, the way in which differential taxation 
drives a wedge  between  the private and national returns to foreign in- 
vestment or borrowing. Thus policy cannot, and markets do not, take it 
for granted that large current account  imbalances  are efficient or even 
sustainable. The developing-country  debt crisis shows that simple theo- 
retical models of sustainable current account deficits can be quite mis- 
leading as to the size of deficit that foreign market lenders will happily 
finance.48 
So far, current theories, whether intertemporally optimizing or of the 
Mundell-Fleming  variety,  have  led  to  an imperfect  understanding of 
46.  For a survey, see Obstfeld and Rogoff(1995b).  Sachs (1981) made an early attempt 
to apply the intertemporal approach empirically. 
47.  See Bulow and Rogoff (1988) for a theoretical discussion  linked to the developing- 
country debt crisis of the 1980s. 
48.  See, for example,  Solomon (1977) and Sachs (1981). 148  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1995 
Figure 7.  Current Account Balances and Real Exchange Rates 
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how  current account  and real exchange  rate movements  are related. 
Krugman has argued that for the 1980-90 period a simple,  stable trade 
equation in which  a country's  current account  surplus depends  nega- 
tively  on its real exchange  rate and negatively  on its relative  income 
(perhaps with lags of up to two years) is fully consistent  with Japanese 
and U.S.  experience.  This conclusion  leads him to the implications that 
real currency depreciation,  other things the same, eventually  improves Maurice Obstfeld  149 
Figure 7.  (continued) 
-2 
Japan  I 
140  -4 
Sweden 
130 
1  7130  -3  8 
120 
0  120  -2  -8 
;  W!!  ~~~~~~~~~~10  -w1  V  1 
2 -  100  0  '190 
3 -90  1 
4  -J  ,2  i  80  2 -  9 
Source:70  3R'a  80 
1960  1970  1980  1990  1960  1970  1980  1990 
-5  1  ~~~~~120  -4  180 
United Kingdom  United States 
-4  \-' 
;I\  110  -160 
A  I  ~~~~~-2  -  -2  ix~~~~~~~~~~-0  A  140 
I  II9 
0-  I  9  '  '  -120 
-80  V\I 
31''17  0  2'''  '  0  1960  1970  1980  1990  1960  1970  1980  1990 
Source:  Real exchange  rates from International Financial  Statistics  (series riilc). Current account/GDP  ratios from 
OECD,  Ecoinomic  Ouitlook, for  1972-94.  Prior to  1972,  current  account/GDP  ratios  are  based  on  dollar  current 
accounts,  exchange  rates, and local currency GDP as reported in International  Finianicial  Statistics. 
a.  Current account  ratios prior to  1972 are based  on dollar current accounts  converted  to local  currency  at year 
average  exchange  rates.  A  rise  in a currency's  real effective  exchange  rate is  a real appreciation  of  the currency 
against foreign currencies. 
b. Real effective  exchange  rates,  1964-94,  are based on normalized unit labor costs. 
the current account,  and that real depreciation  is a needed  component 
of the adjustment to a current account deficit.49 
In figure 7 a fairly consistent  positive  relation between  the real ex- 
change rate and the current account deficit shows up after 1973 for Swe- 
den and, arguably, also for Germany and France. But for Canada, Italy, 
49.  Krugman (1991). 150  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
and the United Kingdom, more complex forces seem to be at work. High 
international  capital  mobility  and  the  variety  of  possible  economic 
shocks give no reason, in principle, to expect any particular correlation 
between a country's current account and its real exchange rate. The cor- 
relation in the data is an amalgam of the effects  of diverse  shocks  over 
the  sample period.  A real depreciation  driven by domestic  monetary 
expansion,  for  example,  may  improve  the  current account  balance; 
while a real depreciation driven by a fall in world demand for a country's 
goods lowers  the current account balance.  The difficulty in identifying 
specific economic  shocks  econometrically  bedevils  any attempt to un- 
derstand the correlations in figure 7. A sensible first step would be to de- 
velop  identified VAR methodologies  such as those  that have been ap- 
plied to exchange rates. 
Figure 7 also illustrates how long-run structural changes complicate 
the relationship between the exchange rate and the current account. The 
dollar real exchange  rate that was roughly consistent  with a balanced 
U.S.  current account over 1964-70 was substantially higher than the real 
exchange rates that accompanied the record deficits of the 1980s. 
In the early 1990s the U.S.  current account deteriorated sharply with 
no substantial real appreciation, although this may have been the result 
of an internationally desynchronized  business  cycle.  It remains to be 
seen how quickly the over 40 percent real appreciation of the yen since 
1990 will ultimately help trim Japan's large surplus, which so far has in- 
creased. 
Policy Effects of the Exchange Rate Regime 
The  Bretton  Woods  framework  created  a comprehensive  interna- 
tional monetary system based on explicit exchange rate rules and a well- 
defined nominal anchor.  Its polycentric  and less  structured successor 
arrangen-'ents  have allowed governments greater freedom to pursue per- 
ceived national interests, but have also removed any discipline over pol- 
icies that membership in a global exchange rate system conferred. Over 
the past twenty-five years, many countries have sought to rein in undis- 
ciplined  monetary  or fiscal  policies  through multilateral or unilateral 
schemes  of pegged exchange  rates. They have not met with noticeably 
greater  success  than countries  with  more  flexible  currency  arrange- Maurice Obstfeld  151 
Table 2.  Inflation in Industrial and Developing Countries since the 1960sa 
Percent 
Countries  1963-72  1973-82  1983-90  1991-94 
Industrial  3.9  9.4  4.1  3.3 
Developing  9.lb  29.4  53.1  50.3 
Source:  For industrial countries,  1963-72,  and non-fuel-exporting  developing  countries,  1968-72,  data come  from 
World Economic  Outlook,  May  1983, tables  7  and 3,  respectively.  For  1973-82,  data are from  World Ecotionoic 
Ouitlook, May  1991, table  A8.  Data after  1982 are author's  calculations  based  on  World Ecotnomic Ouitlook, May 
1991 and October  1994, table A8.  Figures used for  1994 are IMF projections. 
a. Average  annual consumer-price  inflation rate. 
b. Inflation rate is for  1968-72 only. 
ments.  A recent  barrage of  currency  crises,  unprecedented  in scope 
since the early 1970s, has called into question the feasibility of fixed or 
even semifixed exchange rates among sovereign nations with open capi- 
tal markets. 
Inflation and Monetary Accommodation  in Industrial Countries 
The advent of floating exchange rates was accompanied  by an accel- 
eration in worldwide inflation. Table 2 summarizes world inflation expe- 
rience in industrial and (non-fuel-exporting) developing  countries since 
the  1960s. In the industrial countries,  inflation had moderated by the 
mid-1980s. Inflationary pressures in the developing world, however,  in- 
tensified  dramatically through the  1980s, largely in response  to fiscal 
pressures created by the international debt crisis. Only recently have re- 
form efforts,  supported by Brady Plan debt-reduction deals,  enabled a 
number of heavily indebted developing countries to lower inflation from 
very high levels. 
There remains debate about the nature and range of the impulses that 
spawned the inflation of the 1970s, but few doubt that monetary accom- 
modation played  a role,  at least  by allowing those  impulses  to propa- 
gate.50  The  monetary  policy  autonomy  conferred  by  more  flexible 
exchange rates gave governments  latitude to accommodate  inflationary 
market pressures that otherwise might have raised unemployment more 
than they did. But the propensity to accommodate,  once it is understood 
by price setters,  can trap a government  in a vicious  circle of inflation. 
Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott,  followed  by Robert Barro and Da- 
vid Gordon,  have  provided  influential formalizations  of the idea that 
50.  Gordon (1977) evaluates alternative inflation mechanisms. 152  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
greater freedom to gear monetary policy toward a high employment tar- 
get can result in an equilibrium monetary response  that causes  higher 
mean inflation with no gain in mean employment.51 
Figure 8 shows  annual rates of CPI inflation for 1950-94 for the G-7 
countries plus Australia and New  Zealand. After the early 1950s infla- 
tion settled at relatively low levels  outside of France, which undertook 
a major stabilization-cum-currency  reform at the end of that decade.  It 
was already creeping upward by the early  1970s, and jumped  sharply 
when both supply shocks  and floating exchange  rates hit. Through the 
early 1980s inflation remained significantly higher than during the Bret- 
ton Woods  years,  except  in Germany (where it had risen only moder- 
ately  in  1973-74)  and Japan.  From  that  time  on,  France,  Italy,  the 
United Kingdom, and the United States progressively  reduced inflation 
toward the levels prevailing in Germany and Japan. 
What did the exchange rate regime have to do with all of this? Clearly 
the divergent inflation experience  of the 1973-82 period would not have 
been possible  under fixed exchange  rates.  Floating rates,  in contrast, 
freed countries to try to mitigate some economic problems, including the 
first oil shock and high real wages,  through expansive  monetary action. 
Policies  to maintain employment,  and the expectations  that they  cre- 
ated,  propagated the initial effects  of the inflationary pressures  of the 
early 1970s in the countries that pursued them most energetically. 
The ERM, which began operation in 1979, has been interpreted as a 
mechanism  for  "importing"  anti-inflation  discipline  from  Germany 
through a fixed exchange  rate.52  During its early years member curren- 
cies were frequently realigned, but not always by enough to offset infla- 
tion differentials with Germany.  In several  countries,  notably  France 
and Italy, unemployment remained stubbornly high even after the reces- 
sion of the early  1980s had passed.  After January 1987, realignments 
ceased  for nearly  six  years  as  ERM  members  liberalized  capital  ac- 
counts  and  European  Community  (EC)  initiatives  toward  the  long- 
standing goal of economic and monetary unification accelerated.  During 
this period Italy experienced  considerable  real currency appreciation, 
as did Portugal and Spain after pegging to the ecu. 
51.  See Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983). 
52.  See Giavazzi and Pagano (1988) for an influential exposition.  This interpretation of 
the ERM can be rationalized by Rogoff's  (1985) observation  that delegation of monetary 
policy to a conservative  central banker can improve macro performance. Maurice  Obstfeld  153 
Figure 8.  Inflation Rates,  1950-94a 
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Figure 8.  (continued) 
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a. Annual CPI inflation rates, computed  as one hundred times the difference  between  the natural logarithms of the 
current and lagged consumer  price indexes. 
Figure 9 shows  how inflation differences  vis-a-vis  Germany eventu- 
ally converged toward zero, despite their wide dispersion at the start of 
the ERM.53 There is no doubt that EMS membership helped strengthen 
domestic  constituencies  for low inflation. A key mobilizing factor was 
the EC's  increasingly ambitious push toward economic  and monetary 
union. The EMS also fostered domestic institutional changes conducive 
to lower  inflation. For example,  during the  1980s and 1990s moves  to 
make the central banks of Italy and France more independent  of eco- 
nomic policy  ministries were encouraged by a perceived  need for con- 
vergence  in institutions and performance prior to monetary union. But 
the speculative crises that hit the EMS in 1992 and 1993 also showed that 
there are always circumstances  in which sovereign governments will re- 
fuse to subordinate their actions to the most solemn of international eco- 
nomic agreements. 
53.  The original ERM members of 1979, other than Belgium's currency-union partner, 
Luxembourg,  are shown.  Inflation also  fell after ERM entry in Spain (June  1989), the 
United Kingdom (October 1990), and Portugal (April 1992). Maurice  Obstfeld  155 
Figure 9.  Inflation Convergence in the EMS,  1978-93a 
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a. Difference  between  national and German CPI inflation rates. 
Figure 8 suggests  that fixed exchange  rates have not been prerequi- 
sites for disinflation elsewhere  in the world. Japan and the United States 
both reduced inflation through the 1980s and 1990s without the help of 
exchange rate commitments.  So did the United Kingdom, although it ap- 
peared to be backsliding in the years preceding its October  1990 entry 
into the ERM. Australia, Canada, and New  Zealand, shown in the last 
panel of figure 8,  have  all attained inflation rates dramatically below 
those of the 1970s and early 1980s. 
The record after 1970 thus shows,  as Friedman and Johnson argued, 
that low inflation can be attained under floating exchange  rates, given 
the political will. 156  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
The Exchange  Rate  and Inflation Persistence 
In economies  with sluggishly adjusting prices, the greater freedom for 
monetary policy that flexible exchange rates confer can result in a more 
persistent  rate of inflation. Under a fixed exchange  rate, monetary pol- 
icy must be geared toward the exchange rate's defense,  rather than em- 
ployment  stabilization.  But it can be used freely when exchange  rates 
can change.  If price  setters  expect  authorities to accommodate  price 
shocks  that would  reduce  competitiveness  and raise  unemployment, 
those shocks will tend to be propagated through time. This may result in 
greater inflation persistence. 
This point was emphasized  by Dornbusch in a model based on John 
Taylor's  staggered wage-contract  model,  and has recently been tested 
by George Alogoskoufis and Ron Smith, who present evidence  spanning 
more than a century of U.K.  and U.S.  history.54  Alogoskoufis  and Smith 
show  that the degree  of lagged  inflation incorporated  in wage  settle- 
ments (given unemployment) rises sharply both with the end of the clas- 
sical gold standard in 1914, and with the demise of the Bretton Woods 
system.  There are parallel shifts in the persistence  of inflation.55 
In  a  separate  paper  Alogoskoufis  presents  related  results  using 
OECD data from the post-World  War II period starting in 1952.56  He 
finds a tendency for the persistence  of average OECD inflation, as well 
as of national deviations from the OECD average, to rise after 1971. He 
argues that the nominal anchor of the Bretton Woods  system,  the $35 
per ounce gold price that the United States was supposed  to maintain, 
provided a global brake on accommodative  monetary policies before the 
1970s. In turn, Bretton Woods exchange  rate commitments  limited the 
extent to which countries could allow monetary policies  to diverge. 
54.  See Dornbusch (1982), Taylor (1980), and Alogoskoufis  and Smith (1991). Agenor 
and Taylor (1992) and Edwards (1992) apply related models to evaluate the credibility of 
some stabilization programs in developing countries in the 1980s. 
55.  As the model that follows makes clear, changes in inflation persistence after World 
War I could plausibly be attributed to a fall in the frequency of price adjustment. There is 
a large empirical literature on the evolution  of price inflexibility in the United States,  but 
there is no consensus  that prices were more flexible before World War I than after World 
War II. In Obstfeld (1993), I discuss  some international evidence.  Many writers argue that 
the price level was statistically stationary under the gold standard, but the data are some- 
what ambiguous.  Cooper  (1982) discusses  U.S.  price-level  movements  under the gold 
standard. 
56.  Alogoskoufis (1992). Maurice Obstfeld  157 
A  simplified,  small-country  version  of Alogoskoufis's  model,  like- 
wise based on Guillermo Calvo's formulation of staggered price setting, 
motivates  a search for changes in the persistence  of OECD country in- 
flation rates across exchange rate regimes.57 This model will prove use- 
ful later as a vehicle for illustrating interactions among expectations,  the 
real exchange rate, and output. 
With lower-case  letters denoting the natural logarithms of variables 
denoted  by  upper-case  letters,  let  the  demand for nominal  domestic 
money-balances,  m, be 
(4)  mt  =-  Rpt +  (1  -  t)(e,  +  p,*)  +  y, 
where p is the domestic  GDP deflator, e is the domestic  currency price 
of foreign currency, p* is the foreign GDP deflator, y is home output (ex- 
pressed as a deviation from trend),  t is the weight of domestically  pro- 
duced goods in the CPI, and foreign prices are exogenous.  World aggre- 
gate  demand  for  domestic  output  is  a  function  of  domestic 
competitiveness  and a demand shifter, u: 
(S)  Y, =  8(e,  +  pl*  -  pl)  +  ul- 
Above,  8 >  0 is the elasticity of world demand for domestic  output with 
respect to the relative price of foreign and domestic goods. The higher is 
8, the greater is the responsiveness  of demand to a real exchange  rate 
change. 
The  aggregate  price  level  is  a geometric  average  of  the  previous 
period's price level and newly posted prices, denoted by x, with the pa- 
rameter 0 measuring both the (exogenous,  constant)  probability that a 
price is not  revised,  and the proportion of old prices  that continue  in 
effect: 
(6)  Pt=  OPt-I +  (1 -  O)x. 
In general,  parameter 0, which  reflects  the contracting  "technology," 
will respond to inflation conditions,  but I do not model its determination 
here. The lower  is 0, the less  the persistence  in the price level,  other 
things the same. 
Newly  posted  prices are a distributed lead on expected  future CPIs 
and aggregate demand, with expectatioQns  for different future dates dis- 
57.  See Calvo (1983). 158  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
counted by the probability that a price newly posted today will "survive" 
until then: 
(7)  x  =  (1-  0)  I  OiE1_1[Vpp+i  +  (1  -  V)(e?+i  +  p*+i)  +  fy1+1]. 
In equation 7,  +  measures  the response  of new prices to expectations 
about future demand conditions.  Notice  that x, (and hence Pt) is a func- 
tion of date (t -  1) information only, although this is not essential for the 
model.  Closing  the  model  is  the  monetary  policy  rule,  according  to 
which monetary growth follows  a fixed trend, y (perhaps the result of a 
desire  to bring unemployment  below  its natural rate),  and accommo- 
dates a fraction,  x, of market price pressures: 
(8)  Amt =  Y +  a-pt. 
More  general  reaction  functions  could  be  analyzed,  but  equation  8 
allows me to make the main point about the connection  between  mone- 
tary accommodation  and inflation persistence. 
Assume  that the demand shock,  u, follows  the random walk,  ut = 
Ut-  I  +  Et. Then in equilibrium (as appendix A shows),  GDP inflation fol- 
lows the autoregressive  process 
AP, =  (1  -  X})  +  XApt-I  +  qfEt-I 
where  X and qp  are constants  defined in the appendix,  and the steady- 
state equilibrium inflation rate,  n, is increasing in the accommodation 
coefficient,  ax,  that appears in equation 8: 
IT=  1  - 
The key point of the exercise  is that X, the inflation persistence  parame- 
ter, also is increasing in cx.  Thus if fixed exchange rates constrain mone- 
tary policy,  we might expect  the persistence  in Avp  to be lower under a 
fixed rate than when exchange rates can be changed routinely. From the 
dynamic equation for Avp  given above follows the process for the general 
price level,  cpi  =  pp  +  (1  -  >t)(e  +  p*).  The price level follows  an AR- 
IMA(1,1,1) process 
(9)  ACpi,  =  (1  -  X)r  +  XAcpi_1 +  qJ1E1 +  1+2E11, Maurice Obstfeld  159 
as appendix A shows.  It is obviously  critical that A <  1 (which requires 
cx  <  1), if inflation is to be finite.58 
Table 3 reports the first five lagged autocorrelations  of CPI inflation 
for twelve industrial countries.  Based on annual data for the postwar pe- 
riod,  it allows  a comparison  of inflation persistence  during fixed  and 
floating  periods,  where the float is defined to begin in 1971 for Canada 
(notwithstanding  its earlier float), and in 1973 for the other countries. 
The fixed period begins in 1953 for all countries.59 
The data show an estimated rise in inflation persistence  under floating 
rates for all countries except  the United States,  in the sense that the in- 
flation autocorrelations  tend to be higher at lag 1 and to decline  more 
slowly with lag length than under the Bretton Woods regime. In the case 
of the United States, there is little contrast between the two periods. For 
most other countries,  the difference between fixed- and floating-rate es- 
timates is not statistically  significant by standard criteria (the approxi- 
mate standard error of a lagged autocorrelation is 1  INvN,  where N is the 
number of observations  used in forming the estimate).  But despite  the 
small sample size, the near universality of the change in the lagged auto- 
correlation profile is impressive. 
The United States' role as the Bretton Woods reserve center allowed 
it considerable  freedom in domestic  policy.  Thus, the uniformity in in- 
flation persistence  across  time is not surprising for the United  States. 
For the rest, the change between  periods is least noticeable in the cases 
of Canada and the United Kingdom. These countries were also distinc- 
tive,  however.  Canada's float up to  1962 had provided monetary free- 
dom comparable to that which it enjoyed from the early 1970s. And the 
United  Kingdom's  status as the issuer  of an important secondary  re- 
serve currency may have afforded it greater scope  for monetary inde- 
pendence than other countries enjoyed. 
58.  A key assumption to recall at this point is that 0, which measures the sluggishness 
of price adjustment, does not depend on the degree of accommodation.  In reality, as infla- 
tion becomes  very high, multiperiod nominal contracting tends to disappear, reducing 0. 
59.  Initial attempts to estimate equation 9 directly produced some evidence  of model 
misspecification.  Rather than modifying the model, whose  purpose is mainly illustrative, 
I chose to present in table 3 the raw sample statistics  most relevant for judging inflation 
persistence.  I am grateful to Christopher Sims for reinforcing my misgivings  about the 
model-based inflation persistence  estimates,  which I reported in the initial draft of this 
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The higher persistence  of inflation after the early 1970s suggests that 
policymakers  sought to exploit the extra monetary autonomy that float- 
ing rates conferred. Yet greater inflation persistence  per se provides at 
best indirect evidence  about monetary discipline.  In a staggered con- 
tracts model,  even  a policymaker  with no credibility  problem,  in the 
Barro-Gordon sense,  may choose  to accommodate  some price develop- 
ments to reduce unemployment.  While this will raise the persistence, 
and possibly  the variability of inflation, it need not raise the uncondi- 
tional mean of the inflation rate. To put the point another way, the count- 
ercyclical policy that floating rates allow can raise the persistence  of in- 
flation without  creating an inflationary bias in monetary  policy.  Thus 
table 3 shows that low- and high-inflation countries alike experienced in- 
creases in inflation persistence  under floating rates. 
Fiscal  Discipline  in Industrial Countries 
The record of recent industrial-country experience  provides  no evi- 
dence that an exchange rate regime exerts an automatic restrictive disci- 
pline over fiscal policies.  Recourse  to world capital markets has given 
industrial-country  governments  substantial  leeway  to  borrow  even 
while  participating in fixed  exchange  rate  arrangements  such  as  the 
ERM. High government debt levels  or deficits have in some cases  con- 
tributed to  currency  crises  for fixed-rate  countries,  but prophylactic 
public-sector budgetary retrenchment has been rare.60 
Table 4 shows  the evolution  of net public debt for fourteen  OECD 
countries between  1978 and 1993. One of the striking developments  of 
recent decades has been the widespread tendency of industrial countries 
to run up sharply higher public debts without regard to their exchange 
rate obligations.  In only  three  of  the  countries  included  in table 4- 
Japan,  Norway,  and the  United  Kingdom-have  net  public  debt-to- 
GDP ratios declined  since the late 1970s. None  of these  was on a con- 
straining fixed exchange rate regime for much of the period. Conversely, 
countries that did participate in the EMS, including Belgium, the Neth- 
60.  Denmark's fiscal turnaround, starting in 1983, was associated  with fixing the Dan- 
ish kroner-DM  rate within the ERM, and phasing out exchange  and capital controls,  but 
all elements  of the stabilization package were motivated  by a desire  to solve  the public 
and external debt problems that had brought the country's international credit rating into 
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Table 4.  Net General Government Financial Liabilities,  1978 and 1993 
Percent of GDP 
Country  1978 debt  1993 debt 
Belgium  58.2  129.9 
Canada  21.3  61.8 
Denmark  -2.2  32.9 
Finland  -26.6  -7.0 
France  1.9  27.2 
Germany  9.4  35.8 
Italy  57.4  117.9 
Japan  11.2  6.1 
Netherlands  19.7  60.1 
Norway  6.7  -  14.7 
Spain  3.5  42.2 
Sweden  -  25.3  20.2 
United  Kingdom  52.3  40.9 
United  States  21.3  39.6 
Source:  OECD (1994), annex table 34. Negative  entries are net government  assets. 
erlands (which has maintained an unchanged DM parity for the guilder 
since  1983), and Italy,  display  substantially  higher debt levels  than in 
1978. (For EMS countries,  there is no pronounced tendency for general 
government  deficits to decline  with the increasing  stringency  of ERM 
commitments after 1987.) 
This widespread  trend in government  deficits awaits a full explana- 
tion.61 The increasing interdependence  of world capital markets can, in 
principle,  impose  greater fiscal discipline  by confronting chronic gov- 
ernment borrowers with sharply higher interest rates.  But it also may 
provide  at least one  marginal incentive  for expanded  borrowing.  In a 
closed  economy,  an indebted government  must bear the fiscal cost  of 
any rise in the domestic  real interest  rate caused  by a higher deficit. 
When the government of a financially open economy borrows, however, 
it does  not internalize the cost  to other indebted countries  of a higher 
world real interest rate. Thus, all governments may borrow more. In this 
way greater financial integration can encourage tendencies toward over- 
borrowing by individual governments,  and simultaneously  exacerbate 
61.  For discussions,  see  Roubini and Sachs  (1989), Alesina  and Perotti (1995), and 
Lambertini (1995). Roubini and Sachs  find little evidence  that the EMS has encouraged 
fiscal prudence; instead, countries that lost seigniorage afterjoining the EMS and reducing 
inflation appeared to recover that loss by extra borrowing. 164  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
an international coordination failure.62  Figure 10 documents the associa- 
tion between  the average world ratio of public debt to GDP and a mea- 
sure of the world real interest rate.63 
Exchange  Rates  as Nominal  Anchors  in Developing  Countries 
A notable feature of the post-Bretton  Woods period has been the use 
of heavy  exchange  rate management by many developing  countries  in 
their attempts to bring down domestic  inflation. The underlying idea is 
simple: exchange rate stabilization anchors the nominal prices of trada- 
bles,  eventually pulling the inflation rate for nontradables into line with 
that for tradables.  In practice,  however,  prices  of nontradables  have 
risen persistently  despite  exchange  rate stabilization,  often giving rise 
to sizable real appreciations that have undermined the credibility of the 
exchange  rate commitment  central to  inflation stabilization.  It is  the 
countries that have taken the most pragmatic and flexible approaches to 
exchange rate targeting that have succeeded  best in avoiding costly pol- 
icy reversals. 
The developing  countries generally did not opt for floating exchange 
rates after 1973. They pursued exchange rate flexibility through pegs to 
nondollar currencies or baskets,  more frequent devaluations,  or explicit 
crawls. Often, however,  exchange rates were adjusted to accommodate 
domestic  price-level  increases  and real shocks,  a practice  that fueled 
chronic inflation. Pegging was supported by extensive  networks of ex- 
change and capital controls. 
In 1978, Chile (in February), Uruguay (in October), and Argentina (in 
December) turned to a new exchange rate strategy, the tablita: a prean- 
nounced schedule of declining rates of devaluation against the U.S.  dol- 
lar. Rather than passively  accommodating  inflation, the exchange  rate 
would actively push inflation down. The preannounced schedule,  it was 
hoped, would help coordinate inflation expectations  and reduce the de- 
62.  Kehoe  (1987) studies  a theoretical  model  in which  uncoordinated  government 
spending levels  can be too  high because  of incomplete  internalization of the effects  on 
world interest rates. He shows  that the degree of overspending  (relative to a cooperative 
equilibrium) rises as countries become smaller. See Canzoneri and Diba (1991) for a model 
of uncoordinated government borrowing. 
63.  A positive influence of world debt on average world real interest rates is confirmed 
in econometric work by Barro (1992) and Ford and Laxton (1995). In figure 10 the simple 
correlation coefficient between  the two series is 0.70. Maurice  Obstfeld  165 
Figure 10.  World Public Debt and the World Real Interest Rate,  1970-93a 
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Source:  Data on public debt ratios are from OECD,  Economic  Outlook.  Data on GDP are from OECD,  National 
Accointits: Maitn  Aggregates.  Data on long-term nominal interest  rates and CPIs are from OECD,  Main Economic 
Indicators. 
a.  The  world  public  debt  ratio is  a weighted  average  of  ratios  of  net  nominal  public  debt  to  nominal  GDP for 
thirteen countries,  Austria,  Belgium,  Canada, Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  Japan, the Netherlands, 
Sweden,  the United Kingdom, and the United States,  1970-93. National real interest rates are defined as year averages 
of nominal long-term interest rates less  the following  year's  rate of consumer-price  inflation. The world real interest 
rate is a weighted  average of national rates. The country weights  used in both the debt and interest rate calculations 
are the ratio of national GDP,  in dollars, to the total dollar GDP of the thirteen countries  in the sample. 
valuation premium in domestic  nominal interest rates.  All three coun- 
tries opened  their capital accounts,  with Chile taking the most limited 
measures. 
Inflation did not fall into line quickly, however.  In Chile, for example, 
inflation was  still running at 2.5 percent  per month when the country 
fixed its exchange  rate against the dollar in June 1979.64 The result was 
significant real currency  appreciation  that  soon  translated  into  large 
deficits on current account.  Figure  11 shows  the current account  and 
real exchange rate of domestic currency against the dollar for Argentina 
and Chile during the tablita experiments.  Over the course  of  1981-82, 
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Figure 11.  Current Accounts and Real Exchange Rates,  1976-93 
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a.  The  real  exchange  rate,  normalized  so  that  1990  =  100, is  the  ratio  of  the  country's  CPI to  the  U.S.  CPI 
converted  into  local  currency  at the  market exchange  rate.  A  rise  in the real exchange  rate,  so  defined,  is  a real 
appreciation of the domestic  currency against the U.S.  dollar. 
with interest rates at historic highs in the developed  world and the dollar 
appreciating in the foreign  exchange  market,  the  high real exchange 
rates in Latin America's  "Southern Cone" became  impossible  to sus- 
tain. All three programs collapsed  in the midst of foreign exchange  and 
banking crises.65 
At  least  three  explanations,  not  mutually  exclusive,  have  been 
advanced for these dramatic real appreciations.66 The first is an equilib- 
65.  See Diaz-Alejandro (1984) for a survey of the experience  of these and other Latin 
American countries prior to the 1982 debt crisis. Bruno (1993) provides a valuable compar- 
ative discussion  of that experience  and subsequent developments. 
66.  For  alternative  discussions  of  these  mechanisms,  see  Dornbusch  and Werner 
(1994) who focus on Mexico,  and Giovannini (1990) who focuses  on the EMS. There are 
also explanations based on adaptive expectations  or learning, which I do not discuss. Maurice Obstfeld  167 
rium explanation: capital inflows associated  with capital-account  liber- 
alization, along with productivity gains due to accompanying microeco- 
nomic and trade reforms, necessitate  a rise in the real exchange rate. 
The second explanation is based on the role of backward-looking in- 
dexation  mechanisms  inherited from the high-inflation era. For exam- 
ple, replacing the exclusively  forward-looking contracting equation 7 by 
Xt =  w(xt_  I +  Pt-  I -  Pt-2) 
(10)  +  (1  -  c)(1-0)1  OiEtiL[pPt+i 
+  (1  -  ti)(e,+j  +  p*,+i)  +  4yt+?] 
leads to an economy  in which past inflation is automatically embodied in 
new prices in proportion to the parameter w, regardless of how sharply 
or credibly current and past policies  differ. The appendix presents  the 
solution  of a pegged  exchange  rate model consisting  of equations  4-6 
and a simplified version of (10), which substitutes for (7). (A pegged rate 
model drops the money growth rule (8) and instead allows equation 4 to 
determine the money supply endogenously.)  Figure 12 shows  the stag- 
gering initial real appreciation and output decline that result when infla- 
tion is suddenly,  permanently,  and credibly reduced from 100 to 0 per- 
cent  per  period.67 In contrast,  the  corresponding  model  with  newly 
posted prices given by the original equation 7 predicts that a permanent 
reduction in the rate of crawl causes no real appreciation (or recession), 
sticky  prices  notwithstanding.68 The basic  reason  is that Taylor-style 
contracting models of the type described by equations 6 and 7 result in a 
sticky price level,  but not in sticky price inflation.69 
A third explanation for real appreciation which applies even when in- 
flation is not itself sticky is imperfect credibility. This explanation is con- 
sistent with the observation that in stabilizing economies  with open capi- 
67.  The parameter values used are X  =  0.6,  8  =  0.3, 0 =  0.5, p. =  0.6, and 4 =  0.2. 
Here and in figure 13, the real exchange rate is defined as p.(p -  e -  p*). The effects shown 
in figure 12 are somewhat exaggerated because  the simplified version of equation  10 used 
in the simulation minimizes the forward-looking component in new prices. 
68.  This result, which is developed  by Calvo and Vegh (1994) in a more completely 
specified model, is discussed  in appendix A. 
69.  Fuhrer and Moore (1995) contend  that Taylor's  (1980) contracting model cannot 
adequately capture the high persistence  of U.S.  inflation, and propose an alternative for- 
mulation in which nominal wage settlements  are fully indexed to the current price level. 
Equation 10, while not identical to their formulation, is a close relative. 168  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
Figure 12.  Disinflation with Backward Indexation: Effects on the Real Exchange Rate 
and Outputa 
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a. The effects  of reducing inflation from  100 percent  per period to 0,  using the pegged exchange  rate model  with 
lagged  wage  indexation  discussed  in the appendix.  The  real exchange  rate is  defined as  ,u(p  -  e  -  p*),  so  that a 
rise is a real appreciation of domestic  against foreign currency. 
tal accounts,  domestic  nominal  interest  rates  typically  exceed  dollar 
interest rates adjusted for the promised depreciation schedules.  If mar- 
kets doubt that exchange rate commitments will be honored, both nomi- 
nal prices and interest rates will incorporate premiums to guard against 
the possibility of a surprise devaluation.  Figure 13 illustrates the behav- 
ior of the real exchange  rate and output in the original staggered con- 
tracts model based on equations 6 and 7 when markets suddenly begin 
to believe  that the current fixed exchange rate is subject to the risk of a 
one-time 20 percent devaluation. The conditional probability of devalu- 
ation is 25 percent per period and is constant  until the devaluation  oc- 
curs.70 This  experiment  generates  a real appreciation  that eventually 
70.  Thus, the conditional probability of a devaluation this period, given that none has 
yet occurred, is always 0.25, whereas the conditional probability of a second devaluation 
is zero. Other parameter values are 8  =  0.3, 0 =  0.5,  p. =  0.6, and 4 =  0.2. See appendix 
A for the algebraic derivations underlying the simulation in figure 13. Maurice Obstfeld  169 
Figure 13.  Imperfect Credibility: Effects of Risk of Devaluation on the Real Exchange 
Rate and Outputa 
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Source:  Author's  calculations  as described  in the text. 
a. The real exchange  rate is defined as as ,u(p -  e  -  p*),  so that a rise is a real appreciation of domestic  against 
foreign currency. 
reaches 5.6 percent, and a drop in output of nearly 3 percent. The effects 
are potentially even bigger in reality. If market participants believe  that 
policy  ultimately  will  be  accommodative,  spiraling real appreciation 
could result as markets continually revise  upward both the probability 
of devaluation and its expected  size. 
Low credibility played an especially  prominent role in Argentina and 
Uruguay, neither of which accompanied its plan of the late 1970s with a 
convincing  reduction of fiscal deficits.  Indeed in many countries,  gov- 
ernment spending has probably contributed to real appreciation.  Chile 
did achieve  fiscal balance,  but committed  the fatal error of retaining 
lagged wage indexation even after fixing the exchange rate. 
The 1980s produced many other unsuccessful  stabilization plans, but 
also some that, so far, have been  successes.  Israel's  government  em- 
barked on a heterodox stabilization program in July 1985, not only fixing 170  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
the exchange  rate of the shekel against the dollar but also (temporarily) 
controlling wages and prices so as to reduce the economy's  inflationary 
inertia. As figure 11 shows,  although the plan has resulted in real appre- 
ciation of the currency,  the process  essentially  leveled  off in 1988 and 
has been moderate by the standard of some  other stabilization experi- 
ences.  Furthermore,  the current account  has remained at sustainable 
levels.  Contributing to these developments  was the government's  will- 
ingness to engage in considerable  exchange  rate flexibility after August 
1986, including several  devaluations,  the introduction of an exchange 
rate band,  and in December  1991, the introduction  of a crawling ex- 
change  rate band.71 Chile has operated  a moving  exchange  rate band 
since the mid-1980s, roughly halving the annual inflation rate (from 27 
percent in 1985 to 14 percent in 1992).72  As figure 11 shows,  the country 
has experienced  only moderate real appreciation in this period; its cur- 
rent account deficits have been manageable. 
Mexico  and Argentina have also stabilized  since the late  1980s, but 
have adhered to more rigid exchange rate targets and endured more dra- 
matic real appreciations than Chile or Israel. Mexico fixed the peso's ex- 
change rate against the dollar in December  1987, moving to a crawl in 
January 1989, and to a band in December  1991. Its exchange rate policy 
was accompanied by fiscal cuts and yearly pactos  on wages and prices, 
following the heterodox Israeli example. Despite initial success,  by 1994 
a combination of the peso's  real appreciation, a large and growing cur- 
rent account  deficit,  slower  growth,  and political unrest had begun to 
erode confidence in the government's  commitment to keep the exchange 
rate within its preannounced band.73  A devaluation  in December  1994, 
shortly after President Zedillo's inauguration, set off a speculative crisis 
that left the peso floating at levels unimaginable a few months earlier and 
rendered the government unable to roll over its maturing debt without 
official foreign assistance. 
Argentina followed a more drastic, orthodox, route. The government 
slashed its fiscal deficit, and with the April 1991 Convertibility Act, an- 
chored its peso to the dollar, set up a currency board, abolished index- 
ation,  and facilitated  the denomination  of contracts  in foreign curren- 
cies.  Notwithstanding  its  vigorous  attempts  to  defeat  the  problems 
71.  See Bruno (1993) and Bufman and Leiderman (1995). 
72.  Dornbusch and Edwards (1994). Inflation rate data are from International Finan- 
cial Statistics. 
73.  See Dornbusch and Werner (1994). Maurice  Obstfeld  171 
associated  with inertia and credibility, Argentina's peso has undergone 
a real appreciation of more than 60 percent since  1990, and its current 
account deficit is substantial.  The peso  has been under pressure  since 
the Mexican crisis erupted, and Argentina's government has responded 
by making additional fiscal cuts and seeking IMF support. 
Lessons  of Developing-Country  Experience 
What are the main lessons  of developing-country  experience? 
THE  EXCHANGE  RATE.  It is perilous  to rely on the exchange rate as 
the principal long-term instrument for reducing chronic high inflation.74 
A pegged or even fixed exchange rate may be useful in the early stages of 
disinflation-it  signals a break with past instability, immediately affects 
tradables prices,  clearly  indicates  the monetary policy  stance  despite 
shifting money demand, and may lower the output cost of disinflation.75 
But leaving an exchange rate peg in place for long, even after fiscal stabi- 
lization  has been  secured,  invites  trouble.  Most  of the countries  that 
have  successfully  stabilized  have,  in fact,  introduced  substantial  ex- 
change rate flexibility after a relatively brief initial period. Peru provides 
an exceptional  case of a country that has disinflated without even an ini- 
tially pegged exchange  rate. Given the perceived  possibility  of a lapse 
into past excesses,  and the thinness of exchange and other financial mar- 
kets, early transition to a freely floating exchange rate may be impracti- 
cable for most stabilizing developing countries. 
THE  CAPITAL  ACCOUNT.  If a float is impracticable,  some transi- 
tional controls over capital movements  may be a necessary  evil.  Com- 
pletely opening the capital account can impose discipline,  but since the 
move is reversible,  the discipline may be slight. Furthermore, controls 
facilitate the use of direct exchange rate management to avoid excessive 
real appreciation.  Although there are practical difficulties with capital 
controls  (as is discussed  below),  for economies  in the early phases  of 
stabilization they are preferable to a crisis-induced lapse into chronic in- 
flation. 
INCOMES  POLICIES.  The need for incomes policies  when stabilizing 
is more controversial.  Chile has done without them, but its authoritarian 
74.  Stopping a hyperinflation raises somewhat different issues.  For recent discussions 
see Bruno (1993) and Vegh (1992). 
75.  Fischer (1986) offers a formal analysis of this last point. 172  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
regime also reduced union bargaining power during the 1980s.76  In a situ- 
ation of multiple policy equilibria, temporary incomes policies can coor- 
dinate expectations  to achieve a good outcome.  If the government is ac- 
tively  managing  the  exchange  rate  to  avoid  real  appreciation,  and 
monetary aggregates are too unstable to serve as an additional nominal 
anchor, a limited period of incomes policy may serve to prevent immedi- 
ate wage and price pressures  which it might otherwise  be tempting to 
accommodate. 
DISCIPLINE.  One major lesson  is that pegged exchange rates, in and 
of themselves,  have not imposed discipline in stabilization experiments. 
High government  spending often persists,  and appears to contribute to 
the real appreciations  that weaken  exchange  rate-based  stabilization 
programs.77 Too  many  stabilizations  have  succumbed  to  Sargent- 
Wallace unpleasant arithmetic because fiscal deficits have continued de- 
spite  supposedly  irrevocable,  but ultimately  unsustainable,  exchange 
rate targets.78  The political will to stabilize must come first; the exchange 
rate peg is a means to that end. 
The Crisis Problem 
A key question for developed  and developing  countries  alike is the 
feasibility  of maintaining a pegged exchange rate between the currencies 
of sovereign nations when capital is internationally mobile. The collapse 
of the ERM parity grid over  1992-93, along with speculative  probing of 
the exchange rates of currency-board countries like Argentina and Hong 
Kong in 1995, suggests that restrained fiscal and monetary policies  may 
not guarantee immunity from speculative  crises.  Even exchange  rates 
that are technically  sustainable may be attacked, perhaps successfully. 
It is impossible for a government to operate an acknowledged adjustable 
peg in this setting. With capital mobility,  there may be no comfortable 
middle ground between full, irrevocable currency union and floating. 
Krugman provides  an illuminating initial analysis  of speculative  at- 
76.  See Edwards and Cox-Edwards (1987). 
77.  For recent evidence,  see Corbo and Hernandez (1994). 
78.  Sargent and Wallace  (1981). Indeed,  one  can argue, as do Tornell and Velasco 
(1995), that the immediate reaction of a floating exchange rate to a higher fiscal deficit disci- 
plines fiscal policy to a greater extent than does the fear of an eventual crisis under a fixed 
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tacks on unsustainable fixed exchange  rates.79 In his setting, a country 
that is losing foreign reserves must float when reserves hit zero. Because 
money  demand is a negative  function  of expected  currency  deprecia- 
tion, and the currency will be depreciating after a collapse,  speculators 
attack the exchange rate before reserves have run out, ensuring a money 
supply decrease  that reduces  real balances  in line with the rise in ex- 
pected depreciation so as to prevent any anticipated excess  profits from 
currency arbitrage. Transactions  long derided by finance ministers as 
the manipulations  of  malevolent  gnomes  are shown  to constitute  the 
unique,  efficient,  forward-looking  response  to  an inconsistent  policy 
package.80 
Governments  are not  passive  actors  in actual  exchange  crises, 
however,  and recent research has shown that the interaction of markets 
and governments can lend a self-fulfilling element to speculative attacks. 
A shift in market sentiment alone, through its effects on prices, can cre- 
ate conditions in which governments find it optimal to alter the currency 
regime. As a result, the timing of attacks can become indeterminate and 
exchange rate pegs that could have survived in the absence of an attack 
may fall. This reasoning, which views crises as being analogous to bank 
runs, does acknowledge  that fundamental factors matter, since they de- 
termine the political and social costs of alternative policy responses  to a 
crisis. But it implies that fixed exchange rates may be more fragile under 
conditions  of capital mobility than has generally been believed.8' 
There are several mechanisms whereby markets may dislodge an ex- 
change rate that would remain pegged, absent an attack. Most models in 
this genre assume that the government decisionmaker bears a fixed cost 
of deviating from an exchange  rate commitment-arising  from loss  of 
face, loss of office, loss of the chance to head a prestigious international 
organization after retirement, or loss of market confidence.  It is by push- 
79.  Krugman (1979). 
80.  I argued earlier that government  budgetary solvency,  rather than the official for- 
eign exchange stock, per se, is the basic determinant of technical sustainability when gov- 
ernments have access  to world capital markets. The many cases in which continuing fiscal 
deficits have brought solvency  into doubt are, however,  entirely within the spirit of Krug- 
man's analysis. 
81.  In my 1985 Brookings paper, I emphasized  that the potential for self-fulfilling at- 
tacks would render fixed rates fragile under conditions of capital mobility. (Obstfeld,  1985, 
p. 440.) Recent experience  has led other observers to a similar conclusion.  See, for exam- 
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ing the cost of hanging on above the fixed cost of reneging that markets 
can bring about realignments or regime changes.82 
Figure 13 can be used to motivate one example of a self-fulfilling cri- 
sis. Imagine that there is a fixed cost,  c, of realigning the exchange  rate 
and moving to a float. Progressive real appreciation and output sacrifices 
similar to those  shown  in figure 13 will cause  a realignment if the net 
present discounted loss from sticking to the fixed rate ever edges above 
c. Indeed, the model can be set up so that the devaluation fears driving 
the real appreciation are rational, given the circumstances  in which the 
government will find it optimal to validate them. To this end it is neces- 
sary to reintroduce stochastic  output shocks which could push the gov- 
ernment over the edge if unemployment  were  high, even  though they 
could have been tolerated near full employment.  The tendency  in this 
model for attacks to occur when  economic  misery is objectively  high 
does  not prove  that they  are not  driven  in part by  self-fulfilling ele- 
ments.83 
The high nominal interest rates that accompany crises may be enough 
in themselves  to induce governments  to give in. Sweden abandoned the 
krona's ecu peg in November  1992 in part out of concern that high inter- 
est rates would further weaken a troubled banking system and magnify 
the mounting government deficit. Britain's quick exit from the ERM on 
"Black Wednesday,"  September 16, 1992, was encouraged by fears that 
higher interest rates would quickly feed through to indexed mortgages. 
Italy's exit the same day was motivated partly by the difficulty of rolling 
over a massive  short-term government  debt at high interest rates.84 All 
of these episodes  were accompanied  by steep foreign currency reserve 
losses,  but they were the result, not the root cause of market beliefs that 
the krona,  pound,  lira, and other  European  currencies  could  be  dis- 
lodged from their pegs. 
Mexico  has been suffering from both a currency crisis after its failed 
December  1994 attempt at an orderly devaluation of the peso, and a gov- 
ernment-debt funding crisis motivated by fears of outright repudiation. 
82.  For more complete accounts,  see Jeanne (1994) and Obstfeld (1994). 
83.  For example, France was vulnerable to attack in 1992-93 (and remains vulnerable) 
because of its high unemployment.  But is it likely that ERM bands would now be + 15 per- 
cent instead of +2.25 percent had the franc not been attacked in the summer of 1993? 
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These crises have erupted despite the widely held view that a 20 percent 
devaluation would leave the country with sound fundamentals. Without 
the hypothesis  that Mexico's  situation derives  from some of the same 
self-fulfilling elements  as a run on an illiquid (but not insolvent)  bank, it 
is hard to understand why Italy, with a lower current account deficit but 
a much higher public debt-to-GDP  ratio, was spared a similar fate after 
its own 1992 currency crisis.85 
The stochastic  extension  of the Krugman attack model suggests that 
domestic nominal interest rates should have a gradually rising trend rela- 
tive to foreign rates in the run-up to an exchange rate collapse.  The rea- 
son is that, as fundamentals progressively  deteriorate,  both the proba- 
bility that a new shock will lead to a collapse  and the size of the ensuing 
depreciation increase.  It is therefore noteworthy  that the interest-rate- 
based measures of ERM credibility estimated by Andrew Rose and Lars 
Svensson  did not deteriorate markedly until late August 1992, just prior 
to the start of the EMS crisis. This could be explained by market myo- 
pia, or by the theory that the attack was one of two possible  equilibria, 
one of which markets rationally viewed as relatively unlikely until it ma- 
terialized.  In an empirical analysis  of a large sample of speculative  at- 
tacks (including unsuccessful  ones),  actual realignments, and exchange 
rate regime changes,  Barry Eichengreen,  Andrew  Rose,  and Charles 
Wyplosz  seek  significant pre-crisis  changes  in the behavior  of funda- 
mental economic  variables such as the real exchange rate, fiscal deficit, 
export-to-import  ratio, and unemployment.  They find that speculative 
attack episodes  differ among themselves  in displaying  such  changes. 
Their evidence,  while preliminary, suggests  that it may be hard to ex- 
plain many crises  purely on the basis  of  standard, observable  funda- 
mentals.86 
The line between  self-fulfilling crises  and crises justified  by funda- 
mentals should not be drawn too sharply. The true fundamentals deter- 
mining an exchange  rate's sustainability are governments'  preferences 
over policy outcomes  and the constraints that limit their actions.  Since 
constraints are endogenous  through their dependence  on market expec- 
tations,  multiplicities  can  arise  whenever  governments  are unable  to 
85.  Calvo (1988) developed  a seminal model of runs on government debt. 
86.  See  Rose  and  Svensson  (1994)  and  Eichengreen,  Rose,  and  Wyplosz  (1995a, 
1995b). The stochastic  version of the Krugman attack model is due to Flood and Garber 
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commit effectively  to preordained rules. Institutions that tie their hands 
or credibly change their incentives  can eliminate the multiplicity prob- 
lem, but the adoption of a fixed exchange rate per se, even in the context 
of a broader international system,  has proven time and again to be ulti- 
mately a disposable commitment. 
Fixed  exchange  rates could  be maintained under the classical  gold 
standard because governments  operated in a very different political en- 
vironment. Financial interests were dominant, labor had little political 
influence,  and politicians  were  not held as accountable  for economic 
downturns as they are today. The Bretton Woods system operated with 
fairly limited capital mobility for most of its existence,  as did the EMS 
until the late 1980s. Especially  in the EMS, this allowed necessary  rela- 
tive-price  changes  to be achieved  through periodic realignment rather 
than through politically  unacceptable  deflation or inflation. Increasing 
international capital mobility, coupled with the overriding desire of indi- 
vidual governments  to pursue domestic  economic  interests,  tore both 
the Bretton Woods system and the EMS apart. Until sovereign nations 
are willing to relinquish economic  authority to supranational organiza- 
tions to an extent that even the EU  has yet to achieve,  fixed exchange 
rates and capital mobility will remain an inherently  explosive  combi- 
nation. 
The Role  of Concerted Intervention 
If maintaining a pegged exchange rate eventually forces governments 
to confront unacceptable policy trade-offs, perhaps intervention in for- 
eign exchange  markets can offer a relatively painless way to float while 
still promoting relatively  stable exchange  rates. By intervention I refer 
to sterilized intervention, that is, purchases or sales of foreign-currency 
bonds that are matched by equivalent  sales or purchases  of domestic- 
currency bonds,  leaving the monetary base unchanged.  When, for ex- 
ample, the intervening agency trades domestic against foreign currency 
in the forward market, such operations may not appear immediately on 
the government's  books. 
Since  1985, when the Reagan administration abandoned its virtual ta- 
boo on intervention, the G-7 countries-as  well as considerably broader 
coalitions-have  mounted concerted intervention operations on a num- 
ber of occasions.  The most formal embodiment of the new approach was Maurice  Obstfeld  177 
the February 1987 Louvre accord, which set up implicit target ranges for 
exchange  rates. These  did not survive the October  1987 stock  market 
crash. Exchange rate targets have been changed repeatedly  since then, 
and concerted  intervention still occurs when key exchange  rates reach 
levels that the major countries agree are potentially disruptive. The par- 
ticipating  authorities  do  not  seem  to  visualize  these  joint  actions  as 
everyday  events,  but as infrequent signals of official consensus  and re- 
solve.  Ronald McKinnon  has formulated a set of  stylized  descriptive 
rules of conduct for this procedure,  which he credits with having "kept 
the dollar's exchange  rates within narrower ranges from 1987 through 
1992-compared  to the more volatile experience  of the preceding four- 
teen years after 1973."87 
A major question is whether the intervention has actually been effec- 
tive in influencing exchange  rates-and  to pose that question is to real- 
ize that much of the answer hinges on the definition of effectiveness. 
If, bonds  denominated  in different currencies  are imperfect  substi- 
tutes  because  of currency  risk,  then,  provided  the Ricardian equiva- 
lence proposition fails, government operations that change the relative 
supplies of those  bonds in private hands can alter exchange  rates and 
interest rates even when monetary and fiscal policies  are not purpose- 
fully adjusted.88 Such a portfolio channel for intervention effects would 
give authorities a dependable instrument for exchange rate management 
to supplement more conventional  macro policies.  The March 1983 Jur- 
gensen Report, a collaborative central-bank study on intervention,  con- 
cluded that the portfolio effect,  if present at all, is small and short-lived. 
Subsequent work has found statistically but not economically  significant 
effects of asset supplies on excess  foreign-exchange  returns. Even these 
small effects could be due to factors other than the portfolio model.89 
Absent a portfolio effect,  intervention could still have a signaling  ef- 
fect by communicating information to markets and thus altering expec- 
tations.  But what prevents  central banks from sending deceptive  sig- 
87.  McKinnon (1993, p. 34). 
88.  As Backus and Kehoe (1989) point out, however,  a sterilized intervention that has 
these  effects  will generally  alter the government's  intertemporal budget constraint  and 
thus mandate current or future changes in other policies. 
89.  See,  for example,  Dominguez  and Frankel (1993). For alternative discussions  of 
intervention experience  and theory, see Obstfeld (1990), Klein and Rosengren (1991), and 
Edison (1993). The findings of the collaborative central bank study are summarized in Jur- 
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nals,  and  markets  from  discounting  them?  Is  the  transmission  of  a 
truthful message  an effective  additional policy tool if it is no more than 
an announcement  of future changes  in more fundamental  policy  set- 
tings? And if the government desires to send a truthful signal, why is for- 
eign exchange  intervention the best way to do it? None  of these  ques- 
tions has been convincingly  answered. 
Yet  several  recent interpretations of the empirical record hold that 
concerted  intervention has powerful signaling effects  which coordinate 
the  essentially  indeterminate  expectations  of  impressionable  market 
traders to achieve  the outcomes  desired by monetary authorities.  The 
most influential recent paper along these lines is by Pietro Catte, Giam- 
paolo Galli, and Salvatore  Rebecchini,  who base their work on confi- 
dential  1985-91  daily  intervention  totals  supplied  by  sixteen  central 
banks. Williamson, for example,  cites  their results as reason for "new 
optimism" on the potency of intervention.90 
Catte, Galli, and Rebecchini  identify a "concerted intervention  epi- 
sode" by four criteria: 
-At  least two of Germany, Japan, and the United  States intervene 
simultaneously. 
-Intervention  continues  for at least three more days if only one of 
the three banks continues  to intervene,  or for at least one more day if 
two or three banks continue to intervene. 
-Interruptions  in intervention last no longer than five working days. 
-Daily  interventions amount to at least $20 million per bank. 
The other key definition is that of success:  the trend of the exchange 
rate is reversed,  or at least stalled for several months, perhaps with in- 
terruption "by minor rebounds that induce[d] central banks to intervene 
again in the same direction.  "91 
After examining the nineteen concerted intervention episodes in their 
sample, Catte, Galli, and Rebecchini  reach the striking conclusion  that 
all were successful  to some degree. Moreover, all but one major market 
turning point coincides  with a concerted  intervention episode.  The au- 
thors do not see a similarly strong correspondence  between interest-rate 
and exchange  rate changes,  or between  intervention  and subsequent 
policy shifts. 
Post  hoc,  ergo  propter  hoc  reasoning inevitably inspires plausible al- 
90.  See Catte, Galli, and Rebecchini (1994) and Williamson (1993). 
91.  Catte, Galli, and Rebecchini  (1994, p. 206). Maurice Obstfeld  179 
ternative explanations; in this case several suggest themselves  immedi- 
ately.  Concerted  intervention  will  tend  to  occur  precisely  when 
exchange rates reach extreme levels  or make sudden temporary move- 
ments;  but under such  circumstances,  a rebound  might be  expected 
even without the intervention. In many of the episodes  that Catte, Galli, 
and Rebecchini  study,  intervention  went on for many days before the 
turnaround; this  could  imply  that  intervention  has  little  power  but 
ceases  when,  by  luck,  exchange  rates  eventually  reverse  course.  Is 
there not a selection  bias in excluding brief intervention spells or small 
interventions, for authorities might quit quickly when initial efforts meet 
heavy market resistance? For that matter, authorities may not intervene 
at all unless they believe there is a good chance of moving the market.92 
Subsequent evidence,  insofar as it can be culled from public sources, 
reveals a picture somewhat different from the one that Catte, Galli, and 
Rebecchini paint. Figure 14 shows daily data on the yen-dollar spot ex- 
change  rate since  January 4,  1993, together  with dates  on which  the 
United States intervened to sell yen. Broken vertical lines denote inter- 
ventions  that were not coordinated  with foreign monetary authorities, 
whereas  solid vertical lines denote interventions  that were.  The defini- 
tion of coordinated  is a technical one: at least two national authorities 
must be intervening at the same time. Thus, intervention by the United 
States in New  York and the Bank of Japan in Tokyo on the same day is 
not considered  to be coordinated;  nor is United  States  intervention  in 
New York that the Bank of Japan picks up without a break in Tokyo the 
next morning. Appendix B lists the occasions  of U.S.  interventions and 
related interventions by the Bank of Japan in Tokyo. 
Of the interventions in figure 14, that of August  19, 1993, looks most 
like  the  ones  Catte,  Galli,  and Rebecchini  identify  as  "definite" suc- 
cesses.  It was buttressed by Treasury Undersecretary  Lawrence  Sum- 
mers's expression  of U.S.  opposition to further yen appreciation, which 
served to counter the impression that the United States intended to use 
dollar depreciation as a lever to pry open Japanese markets. The inter- 
vention did not occur until three days after  the dollar had started to rise 
92.  Truman concludes:  "By my own  personal judgmental criteria, intervention  was 
partially successful  in about five of the episodes  [studied by Catte, Galli, and Rebecchini], 
and I think this is a good enough record to support the continued judicious use of interven- 
tion as a supplementary policy instrument." (Truman, 1994, p. 249.) See Weber (1994) for 
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Figure 14.  Daily Yen-Dollar Exchange Rate and U.S.  Interventions 
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Coordinated interventions  shown  by solid line; noncoordinated  interventions  by dashed line. 
Source:  Exchange  rates from Itnternationial  Finanicial Statistics.  Intervention  episodes  are reported in the Federal 
Reserve  Bulletinz  and the New  York Timnes. 
from an August 16 local minimum against the yen. This strengthens the 
view that intervention sometimes  appears powerful because authorities 
choose  to act after market pressures have eased. 
The interventions of April 1993, June 1993, April-May  1994, and No- 
vember 1994 described in appendix B might be judged limited successes Maurice Obstfeld  181 
by some criteria. But the April 1993 intervention kept the dollar above 
Y 110  for less than a month; the June 1993 turnaround, which in any case 
was very short-lived, was the result of the Miyazawa government's  fall; 
that of May  1994 lasted for only about one month; and the November 
1994 action,  which was not joined  by European central banks, did not 
reverse  the  dollar's  downtrend.  The  subsequent  short-lived  reversal 
came only after November  15, when the Federal Reserve  raised U.S. 
interest rates by an unexpectedly  large amount. 
In contrast, the May 27-28,  1993, intervention had no discernible ef- 
fect.  It was not, technically  speaking, coordinated,  but it involved  two 
days of intervention by both the Federal Reserve and Bank of Japan, and 
continuing  Bank of Japan intervention  through early June.  The June 
1994 intervention failed to stop the dollar from falling below Y 100.93  And 
the March 1995 U.S.  intervention effort, which failed to stop the dollar's 
fall below  Y95,  was  abandoned  because  officials  believed  that it was 
having no effect.  The market temporarily stabilized in a range of 88-89 
yen per dollar, but the rate then plunged to the low 80s despite concerted 
intervention in the first week of April 1995. It can always be argued, after 
the fact,  that intervention failed because  the authorities were trying to 
defend disequilibrium exchange  rates.  But the argument that a rate of 
Y85 per dollar undervalues the yen has yet to be made.94 
My reading of this evidence  leads to a very different view of interven- 
tion's powers than the one Catte, Galli, and Rebecchini propose.  Inter- 
vention can be useful in providing a costly and therefore informative sig- 
nal of official intentions  when  markets are confused  about policy.  An 
example  might be the August  1993 operation,  which helped clarify the 
U.S.  attitude toward the role of the exchange  rate in trade negotiations 
with Japan. But intervention, acting alone, cannot halt market trends for 
long, let alone reverse them. It would be irresponsible and counterpro- 
93.  In evaluating all such episodes,  there is the logical possibility  that the exchange 
rate would have fallen even more without intervention.  In the absence of a reliable model 
for explaining short-term exchange  rate movements,  there is no way to know.  But the Y 
100 mark, like the Y  110 mark before it, seemed an official "line in the sand." The fact that 
it was crossed is indicative of the limited powers of sterilized intervention. 
94.  The April 25 G-7 communique  declaring that exchange  rates "have gone beyond 
levels justified by economic  conditions" was not accompanied by renewed U.S.  interven- 
tion, although it was preceded  by a cut in Japan's interest rates. Its release  boosted  the 
dollar by more than 2 percent in next-day trading, but did not appear to initiate a new up- 
ward trend. See  "Dollar Up Sharply Against Yen in Biggest  Rally in 20 Months," New 
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ductive for governments to enter into coordination arrangements on the 
assumption that exchange rate stability can be had for free, without hard 
compromises  of monetary and fiscal sovereignty. 
Spillovers and Monetary Policy  Coordination  Failures 
One implication of short-run price stickiness  is that even  monetary 
shocks  will  be  transmitted  abroad in the  short  run,  through output, 
wealth, terms-of-trade, and world interest rate effects.  Even if exchange 
rates provide long-run insulation, they are powerful transmitters of for- 
eign shocks in the short run. In some settings the effects may be perma- 
nent.95  These spillovers suggest potential international coordination fail- 
ures in monetary as well as borrowing policies. 
The worldwide recession  of the early 1980s has been widely cited as 
such a coordination failure.96  As a result of the U.S.  disinflation and dol- 
lar appreciation,  other industrial countries  faced  depreciating  curren- 
cies and unwelcome  inflationary pressures. Their contractionary mone- 
tary responses  put additional upward pressure  on world real interest 
rates and contributed to an unnecessarily  deep world recession.  In con- 
trast, a cooperative  approach to disinflation that did not try to exploit 
the exchange rate as an aid to disinflation might have allowed the indus- 
trial world to achieve a lower sacrifice ratio. 
How  important were these  effects?  Gilles  Oudiz and Jeffrey Sachs 
made the first empirical attempt to quantify the costs  of coordination 
failures among industrial countries and found them to be modest.97 The 
subsequent  literature remains  divided  on the  question,  although it is 
clear that much (unequally) shared pain could have been avoided,  had 
industrial countries  internalized the effects  of their policies  on devel- 
oping countries in the early 1  980s. A general limitation of all this work is 
that the models  lend themselves  to somewhat  ad hoc welfare criteria. 
In recent work Rogoff and I develop  an example in which the properly 
computed  welfare  effects  of  some  prominent  monetary  policy  spill- 
overs, though important individually, cancel out collectively.  The basic 
reason is that, starting from a full-employment  position,  the spillovers, 
95.  See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995a). 
96.  McKinnon (1984) and Oudiz and Sachs (1984) are among the analyses that emerged 
soon after the events described. 
97.  Oudiz and Sachs (1984). Maurice Obstfeld  183 
which include terms-of-trade and current account effects,  reflect intra- 
temporal  or intertemporal  reallocations  of  second-order  importance. 
The assumptions  of the example are unlikely to hold in reality (notably 
the assumption of a full-employment  starting position), but it does show 
the need for more careful thought about the nature and costs  of policy 
spillovers.  The example also gives reason to question Nurkse's  account 
of the evils  of competitive  currency depreciation  in the context  of the 
Great Depression.98 
Germany's reunification after 1989 caused a coordination failure with 
a more localized but still dramatic impact, and it was the result of fixed, 
not floating, exchange  rates.  The coordinated  response  to that shock, 
one that the ERM delayed  but that markets eventually  forced,  was an 
appreciation of the mark relative to other European currencies,  so as to 
simultaneously  relieve  inflationary pressure in Germany and deflation- 
ary pressure in its partners. The example shows that appropriate policy 
coordination  need  not  require,  or  be  enhanced  by,  exchange  rate 
targets. 
The G-7 countries  turned to closer  consultation  on macroeconomic 
policies  in 1985, but despite fairly regular coordination on intervention, 
there is no hard evidence  of coordination  in monetary or fiscal policy. 
George  von  Furstenberg and Joseph  Daniels  argue that the degree  of 
G-7 government  compliance  with the economic  undertakings made at 
annual summits if anything has been lower since 1985 than before.99 
Lessons and Options for Reform 
The national autonomy in exchange rate arrangements that broke out 
in the early 1970s and was codified by the IMF in January 1976 has not 
been the disaster that Nurkse might have feared.  But neither has it led 
to the promised land of economic  stability, international harmony, and 
unchallenged free trade that Friedman and Johnson desired. 
98.  Obstfeld  and  Rogoff  (1995a).  Nurkse's  view  has  been  questioned  on  related 
grounds by Eichengreen and Sachs (1985). A survey of empirical results on macro policy 
coordination is included in McKibbin and Sachs (1991). 
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Five  Lessons 
The  lessons  learned  or relearned  are many and complex,  but five 
stand out: 
-Flexible  exchange  rates have  been  very  successful  in delivering 
their two main benefits. They have largely insulated countries from for- 
eign inflation trends over  the long run; and they generally  have given 
countries the means to mitigate short-run fluctuations in output and the 
current account  that nominal rigidities otherwise  would  magnify.  Ex- 
change rate flexibility has not, however,  prevented the transmission of 
policy shocks,  nor has it removed potential gains from policy coordina- 
tion.  Fixed  exchange  rates  may  promote  symmetrical  polices  when 
countries  share the burden of maintaining a parity, but they need  not 
bring about favorable coordinated policy outcomes. 
-There  may be no turning back in the foreseeable  future. Attempts 
to maintain fixed exchange  rates for long periods usually have proven 
inconsistent with the degree of openness to international capital markets 
that most  industrial countries  now allow.  The basic reason is that the 
governments  of  sovereign  nations  still place  domestic  considerations 
ahead of exchange rate commitments.  A speculative  attack that causes 
enough domestic pain can bring down even a pegged exchange rate that 
is technically  sustainable.  With high capital mobility there may be no 
comfortable middle ground between  currency union and floating. 
-While  long-run exchange rate behavior can be rationalized in terms 
of standard economic  theory,  the short-run behavior of exchange  rates 
is often difficult to explain,  even  ex post.  In particular, exchange  rate 
variability, while somewhat lower than that of other asset prices, seems 
much greater than that of plausible observable fundamentals. Even me- 
dium-term exchange  rate swings  lasting  several  years  are sometimes 
hard to explain.  Despite  the strong possibility  that much of short-term 
exchange rate dynamics results from the interaction of noise and diffuse 
expectations,  there is no compelling evidence  that sterilized foreign-ex- 
change intervention,  even when carried out by several countries acting 
in concert, is a reliable tool of expectations  management independent of 
monetary and fiscal policies. 
-Excessive  exchange  rate volatility  imposes  undeniable economic 
costs,  especially  when it leads to cumulative  persistent  movements  in 
real exchange  rates.  When a substantial component  of wealth (human Maurice  Obstfeld  185 
capital) cannot be effectively  hedged and its owners  cannot access  fi- 
nancial markets at reasonable  cost,  greater exchange  rate uncertainty 
can entail substantial welfare losses.  Another cost comes from the way 
in which exchange rate movements encourage protectionism.  However, 
it is not clear that exchange rate volatility per se has had an economically 
important dampening effect  on trade in goods  and services  or capital 
flows. 
-Despite  early policy mistakes,  exchange rate flexibility has not led 
to a permanent state of undisciplined  inflation in industrial countries, 
nor have pegged rates been either a necessary  or a sufficient means for 
developing  countries  to reduce chronic inflation. Although the persis- 
tence of inflation rates in most industrial countries has been higher dur- 
ing the floating-rate era than during the Bretton Woods era as a result of 
more aggressive countercyclical  policy, this need not imply higher mean 
inflation and indeed,  persistence  has  risen  in low-  and high-inflation 
countries alike. Industrial-country fiscal excesses,  which threaten to be- 
come  an even  bigger problem in the future, do not seem  to be signifi- 
cantly influenced by exchange rate arrangements. 
In the light of these  lessons,  what options  are there to improve the 
functioning of the system? 
A Return to Pegged  Rates? 
Even if fixed exchange rates were feasible given countries' desire for 
access  to the world capital market, there is no presumption that they 
would be an improvement  over  the current system,  especially  if they 
lacked full credibility. The optimum-currency area logic discussed in my 
1985 Brookings paper shows  why big areas like Europe, Japan, and the 
United  States  will  prefer  flexible  rates  on  macroeconomic-stability 
grounds when asymmetric nonmonetary shocks,  such as shifts in world 
trade patterns,  are frequent.100 Simulations  of  major macroeconomic 
models give strong empirical support for this position. 101  Richard Coo- 
per's proposal of a single currency for the industrial democracies  avoids 
the problem of defending fixed exchange rates, and yields additional ef- 
ficiency advantages by vastly expanding the size of the market served by 
100. Obstfeld (1985). 
101.  See,  among  many others,  McKibbin  and Sachs  (1991),  Bryant,  Hooper,  and 
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a single monetary unit. He recognizes,  however,  that his plan remains 
utopian,  for now.  102 
Target Zones? 
Target zones for exchange rates are designed to give countries greater 
autonomy over policy while imposing a stabilizing effect on volatile ex- 
change markets. The most detailed recent blueprint has been offered by 
John Williamson and Randall Henning, who envision zones  ? 10 percent 
wide. 103  To the extent that a broad zone gives policymakers  more room 
for maneuver, it is superior to a peg. But is a zone better than a float with- 
out edges?  One drawback of target zones  is that they may not exert a 
stabilizing effect  unless  markets are confident that their edges  will be 
defended  successfully.  The difficulties in defending rigidly fixed rates, 
however,  apply fully to the edges  of target zones,  as was illustrated in 
March 1995 by the Spanish peseta's crash out of a band much wider than 
most proponents of target zones advocate.  If markets can figure out the 
fragility of the edges  and perform the requisite backward induction,  a 
target zone loses much of its stabilizing power. It may even become  de- 
stabilizing. 
Williamson argues that two "golden rules" of exchange rate manage- 
ment suffice to overcome  the crisis problem, even  under conditions  of 
capital mobility: first, never defend a disequilibrium exchange rate; and 
second,  never change the parity by more than the width of the band. 
These  rules imply that zones  will be changed frequently by relatively 
small amounts as governments  revise their views  of where equilibrium 
exchange rates lie. But both rules pose problems. 104 
One problem is that governments  cannot be certain that the equilib- 
rium rate  which  they  are targeting has  not  suddenly  changed.  Con- 
fronted with a market show of force, authorities will be tempted, as the 
United States and Japan were in the spring of 1995, to revise their esti- 
mate of equilibrium and give in. Another problem comes from the possi- 
ble destabilizing properties of frequent small shifts in the band. As Flem- 
ing stated in a much earlier debate on target zones: 
102.  McKinnon (1984, 1988) makes the case for returning to fixed rates. A proposal for 
a single currency for industrial democracies  is outlined in Cooper (1987). 
103.  See  Williamson  and Henning  (1994).  The  debate  over  target zones  in BPEA, 
1:1986, remains very relevant, as is Cooper (1994). 
104.  Williamson (1993, pp. 195-96). Maurice Obstfeld  187 
If a government makes a decision,  or if it consents  to a small change in its parity, 
this is likely to be taken by the market as evidence  that the authorities consider 
the rate to be significantly out of line. Governments  are quite unable to detect, 
and even if they could detect,  are unable to admit to, divergencies from equilib- 
rium until these are significantly large. There will therefore be a high probability 
of continued small rate changes in the same direction and some remaining possi- 
bility of a large discrete  change; the market will know that countries  have not 
given up the right to make a big change. They will know that the authorities think 
there  is  something  wrong  with  the  rate or they  wouldn't  agree  to  the  small 
changes.  They  know,  therefore,  that if speculation  develops  sufficiently,  the 
government may be forced into the larger change. 
I think this combination  of circumstances  is one which would lead to even 
greater disequilibrating speculation  than under the present system....  I carry 
the argument one stage further. It would be my feeling that governments,  fearing 
precisely  the effect on speculation that I have described, fearing in other words 
that if they allow a small change it will be taken as evidence  of their view as to 
the necessity  for a larger one, will exercise  their discretion by refusing to glide, 
thus frustrating the whole system. 105 
Fleming's  scenario  brings into question  whether  Williamson's  sec- 
ond  rule will  discourage  speculation.  It  need  not.  First,  as  Fleming 
notes,  the government  cannot  credibly  commit  to  making only  small 
changes  in the parity; nor can it abjure the right to make many small 
changes  in rapid succession.  To assume  that it can is to assume  away 
the crisis problem. Second,  even if such a commitment were possible,  a 
change in the band, no matter how small, will permit the exchange  rate 
to jump  discretely,  particularly  if  speculative  pressure  has  already 
driven the rate to the relevant edge of the prior band. Thus ensuring that 
the previous exchange  rate lies within the new zone need not eliminate 
expected  speculative profits; indeed, the wider the zone, the less the cap 
on expected  profits. 
Aside from these  difficulties in choosing  the zone's  location,  how is 
the current zone  to be maintained? Sterilized  intervention,  I have ar- 
gued,  will not suffice.  Fiscal  policy  lacks the required flexibility.  This 
leaves monetary policy, and all the problems of gearing monetary policy 
to an exchange rate target. Matters are even more complex in a multilat- 
eral system of zones because countries must negotiate over who will ad- 
just monetary policy to keep the mutual exchange  rate in its zone.  Wil- 
liamson and Henning propose an imaginative rule for sharing the burden 
105.  Fleming (1970, p.  162). The zones  that Fleming discussed  were  narrower than 
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of monetary adjustment. The key questions are whether the rule can be 
made operational, and whether countries would abide by it in practice. 
The reluctance of either Japan or the United  States to alter macroeco- 
nomic policies  in response  to the plunge of the yen-dollar rate in 1995 
exemplifies  the type of disagreement that is bound to arise, even when 
countries agree in principle on desired exchange rates. 
Sand in the Wheels? 
James  Tobin  has  suggested  discouraging  short-term roundtripping 
between  currencies  by  means  of a small tax on all foreign  exchange 
transactions, levied collectively  by the international community. His ra- 
tionale  is  that the  tax  would  reduce  the  volume  of foreign-exchange 
transactions motivated by short-term exchange  rate speculation  rather 
than consideration  of  longer-term  relative  international  returns.  Be- 
cause such a tax could make pegged exchange  rates easier to maintain, 
Eichengreen  and Wyplosz  have suggested  its limited use in EU  coun- 
tries as a transitional device on the road to monetary unification. 106 
A coherent case can be made for a Tobin tax in the context of stabiliz- 
ing developing  countries,  which  need  to  manage exchange  rates  and 
have relatively  shallow financial markets, and where the cost  of failed 
stabilization is extremely high. But in the context of developed countries 
with flexible exchange  rates, the case is much less compelling.  Even if 
the Tobin tax could  be globally  adopted-and  any defecting  country 
could  hope  for  handsome  profits-financial  institutions  would  con- 
stantly seek new ways to evade it. Enforcement costs and evasion costs 
would have to be added to the deadweight efficiency costs due to distor- 
tions of trade as well as capital movements.  Furthermore, the tax would 
discourage  stabilizing short-term transactions  along with destabilizing 
bandwagon trades, thus adding an aggravating factor to short-term and 
possibly even to longer-term volatility. 107 
What would  this costly  tax  accomplish  for countries  with  floating 
106.  See Tobin (1978) and Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993). These three have recently 
collaborated to update their views  and respond to critics;  see  Eichengreen,  Tobin,  and 
Wyplosz (1995). 
107. The Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Market Speculation and Corporate 
Governance rejected the idea of new transaction taxes in U.S.  securities markets on essen- 
tially these grounds. See Twentieth Century Fund (1992). Maurice  Obstfeld  189 
rates? We have no idea. As noted above,  there is no presumption that 
the tax would, on balance, reduce exchange  rate volatility.  Nor is there 
any presumption that it would significantly enhance the powers of mone- 
tary policy.  It is a general principle of welfare economics  that an added 
distortion can be helpful in the presence  of preexisting distortions such 
as wage and output-price rigidity. But it does not follow  that any addi- 
tional distortion is a good thing. Lacking a complete  understanding of 
exchange rate determination, it is not possible  to form a reliable picture 
of how a Tobin tax would work in practice. 
Matters are more complex  in the European context,  where govern- 
ments may be willing to trade off economic  goals against political ones. 
A foreign-exchange  transactions tax, or the noninterest-bearing deposit 
requirements that Eichengreen and Wyplosz also discuss,  could play at 
least some role in slowing down capital movements  and facilitating the 
defense  of exchange-rate  targets.108  Yet,  interventions  in capital mar- 
kets could just as easily be counterproductive.  Although the proposed 
measures are meant to be modest, authorities would be strongly tempted 
to  intensify  them  in crises,  thus  creating  expectations  that could  be 
highly destabilizing.  Furthermore, extensive  evasion  is inevitable.  For 
these reasons,  I do not believe  that the Tobin tax or other mild restric- 
tions on capital movements  could do much to help Europe out of its cur- 
rent monetary dilemma.109 
The Next  Twenty-five Years 
Flexible  exchange  rates among  the  main trading blocs  will  not be 
abandoned  anytime  soon  because  they  are simply too  useful,  despite 
their high and often puzzling volatility.  There are nonetheless  several 
feasible changes to the current system that would make it easier to live 
with: 
-The  Bretton Woods system was set up in the belief that only stable 
exchange  rates were compatible  with free trade. After World War 11, 
internationally  coordinated  trade reform proceeded  at a slower  pace 
than monetary reform, but progress on trade has steadily progressed, 
108.  See  Eichengreen  and  Wyplosz  (1993) and Eichengreen,  Tobin,  and  Wyplosz 
(1995). 
109.  For recent critical discussions  of the Tobin tax and related proposals,  see Garber 
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whereas Bretton Woods is long gone.  The new World Trade Organiza- 
tion, which completes  the triad of international agencies originally envi- 
sioned by the Bretton Woods agreement,  can play an important role in 
ensuring that exchange  rate swings do not undermine free trade. Gov- 
ernments should treat its rulings with respect,  and its powers should be 
gradually extended. 
-The  IMF seemed  to have lost its raison d'etre with the demise  of 
fixed exchange  rates.  One of  the organization's  fundamental  original 
purposes,  however,  was to step in where private capital markets could 
not or would  not,  so  as to ease  the pressure  of balance-of-payments 
problems on employment  and growth. The Fund is in a better position 
than national governments  to make lending decisions  on economic,  as 
opposed to political grounds. It can and does continue to fulfill this role, 
but its current resources  are inadequate to the task, and should be aug- 
mented. More stringent Fund surveillance and conditionality are essen- 
tial if greater resources are to be effectively  used. 
-Policy  coordination has tight limits, but it can be useful when coun- 
tries perceive  opportunities for mutual current gain. The G-7 consulta- 
tive process  remains critically useful as a forum in which information is 
exchanged  and potential policy trades are explored; it is even conceiv- 
able that more effective  policy coordination will evolve  over time, per- 
haps on the basis of an expanded  group of countries.  Concerted  inter- 
ventions cannot substitute for fundamental policy shifts, but if used with 
restraint, they  can help clarify official intentions  and goals.  Exchange 
rate targets should not be allowed  to stand in the way of sensible  poli- 
cies, and policymakers should avoid linking their prestige and credibility 
to particular exchange rate targets. 
-Continued  development  of international financial markets and in- 
struments offers the promise of more efficient international risk sharing, 
both for industrial countries and (as they mature) developing  countries 
and  economies  in  transition  from  socialism.  New  instruments  that 
would allow trade in the present values of national GDPs, along the lines 
suggested  by Robert Shiller,  might mitigate problems associated  with 
the noninsurability of human capital."10  Such innovation  would reduce 
individual costs of exchange rate volatility. To reduce the systemic risks 
that are a by-product of financial innovation,  especially  in an interna- 
110.  See Shiller (1993). Maurice  Obstfeld  191 
tional context,  national authorities should continue and extend their col- 
laborative efforts in the oversight  of banks and other financial institu- 
tions. 
-Countries  should continue to seek and establish domestic political 
and economic  institutions,  such  as  central  bank independence,  that 
encourage  monetary and fiscal stability at home.  This would promote 
continuity in economic  policy,  which, in turn, would enhance the credi- 
bility of policymakers'  promises to their foreign counterparts, possibly 
expanding the set of feasible international policy trades to include trades 
over time. Flexible exchange rates need not be an impediment to domes- 
tic institutional reform; and successful  reform may well contribute to re- 
ducing exchange rate volatility. 
APPENDIX  A 
Overlapping Contracts  Model 
THIS APPENDIX  solves  the overlapping contracts  model of the text and 
derives some of its key properties. 
Model Solution:  Floating  Exchange  Rate 
Apart from a constant that can be ignored, the monetary policy func- 
tion (8) can be written as 
(A1)  mt =  yt +  otp,. 
Combining (Al)  with (4) shows  that the foreign price level  in domestic 
currency units is 
(A2)  e, + pt*  =(Ot  +  R,  +  wt -  u, 
Let L denote the lag operator, such that Lz, =  z,  1  for any variable z, 
and let L'-I be its inverse,  the lead operator. Then the equation for the 
average price of domestic output, (6), can be written as 
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while newly posted prices, from equation 7, can be expressed  as 
(1 -  0)EEl[tip,  +  (1 -  t)(e,  + p,*) + 4yj] 
xi =  I -  OL-1 
Together these last two equations show that p follows  the second-order 
difference equation 
(A3)  (1 - OL-')(1  -  OL)p, 
=  (1  -  0)2 E,_J[tp,  +  (1 -  [)(e,  +  p,*)  +  )yj]. 
Equations A2 and 5 allow equation A3 to be rewritten (recall that p is 
predetermined) as 
-2  1 +  02  -  (1  -0)2pl  + 
(A4)  -  OL[L2 
-  0L  1+  l]p, 
-  (1 
-  0)2 E, _(Wuut  +  W yt), 
where wp, wx, and w, are defined by 
5(1 -  )(1-  )  UOp  o  c  +  I  +  8- 
(A5)  Wu  I +)(1 
- 
1 +  5- 
-  1 +  5-F 
The second-degree  polynomial  in the forward lag operator on the left- 
hand side of equation A4 has the factorization 
-2  1 +  02  -(1  -  2l) 
(6)  L 
+ 
-  L-  +  1 =  (L  -  ,)(L- 
0 
where the roots  >  1 and X <  1 are given by the quadratic formula as 
1 +  02  -  (1  -  0)2]  +_02  -  -  0)2W  4 
(A7)  4,A=  2 
Use  of (A4) and (A6) now shows  that the date-t average GDP deflator 
has the solution: 
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(1I -  0)2 
0 
(A8)  pt =  Xp,_1  +  (  iY;  )  i  -E,-I[w,,u,+  ++ w.y(t  +  i)]. 
i=O 
Under the random-walk assumption on u, u, =  u,_  +  El,  equation A8 
may be first-differenced to yield 
(A9)  Ap,  =  XA/p_  +  (1  )  (02  Y  +  wEl1) 
0q-  1)(WY 
-  (1  -  X)T +  XAp,  -I  +  4'El1, 
where  -a  y/(l  -  oc). This is the equation for GDP-deflator inflation 
given in the text. 
The central result on inflation persistence  in this model is that 
dX  0 
dot 
so that inflation persistence  rises with monetary accommodation.  To see 
this, note from (A5) and (A7) that 
dX = dX dwop  X(1  -  0)2W  >0 
dot  dwp  dot  [1  +  02-(1-0)2W  2  _1 
The price level for consumers  is defined as cpi  =  ,tp  +  (1 -  i)(e  + 
p*). By equations A2 and A9, this price index follows an ARIMA(1 1,,1) 
process  with autoregressive  parameter X: 
(AIO)  /\cpi,=  (I1-X)  +  A/cpi_-  +t 
+  {ip[5  +  (1  -  0x)(l-  A)]  +  (1  -  R)XIE,- 
I  +  -  11 
which has the same form as equation 9 in the text. 
Model  Solution:  Pegged  Exchange  Rate 
In the case of a pegged exchange rate with date- t value el, equation 4 
is used only to determine the (now endogenous)  supply of money.  Fol- 
lowing the same steps as in the last case,  but taking e and p* as exoge- 
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(Al1)  -OL[L-2  1 +  02  -  (1  -  0)2(  -  8)L-1  +  l]p,  0 
=  (1 -  0)2E,_I[(I  -  t  +  48)(e,  +  p,*)  +  u 
The polynomial in square brackets on the left-hand side of (Al 1) can be 
factored  as (L  -  -)(L-  -  -  X), where  now 
1 +  02 -  (1  -  0)2(R  -  +8)  I  +  02 -  0)2(V  2 
2 
The implied equation for p, derived in the same way as equation A8, is 
(A 12)  pt  =  Xp  _  +  (  ` 
Lo-E,_[(l  -  ,t  +  48)(e,+i  +  p*,+i) 
+  0  + i]- 
To prove Calvo and Vegh's result concerning the neutrality of a credi- 
ble permanent change in inflation,112 imagine that on date (t  -  1) it is 
announced that e, which had previously been fixed, will now rise at rate 
-a between  dates  (t  -  1) and t,  and in all future periods.  (Thus,  e,  = 
e, -  +  Tr, e,+  I =  e,  +  21T, and so on.) Because  the price equation, (6), 
can be written as 
AP,  =  (1  -  0)(x,  -  1), 
it is clear that the inflation rate will jump immediately to its new steady- 
state level,  -a (thereby precluding any real appreciation), provided that 
x, jumps by the amount -a/(I -  0) after the announcement.  That this is 
what happens can be checked using equation 7. Under the tentative as- 
sumption that the economy  moves right away to a new steady state, the 
change in x, indeed is 
cc 
(1  -  0)  o i(i  +  1)-r=  1  =  0 
Thus, the new prices posted on date (t -  1) rise by precisely  enough to 
place the economy  on its new steady-state  inflation path. 
The simulation underlying figure 13 in the text  assumes  a baseline 
case with p*  =  u  =  e  =  0, and a constant probability K per period of a 
realignment of the exchange rate to e  =  r. Under that assumption, 
112.  See Calvo and Vegh (1994). Maurice Obstfeld  195 
E, _e,,i  =  [K  +  K(l  -  K)  +  .  .  .  +  K(l  -  K)i]r  =  [1  -  (1  -  K)'+  ]r, 
provided that realignment has not yet occurred. Equation A 12 therefore 
becomes 
(1  -  0)2(1-  +  j58);Kr 
pt =  I  Ap_I  + 
O(Q -  1)(K  +  1) 
This formula was used to generate figure 13, which plots p(p,  -  e,  -  p,*) 
against time. 
To generate figure 12, which also plots  t(p,  -  e,  -  p,*)  against time, 
equation 10 was replaced by a simpler version, 
(A13)  xI  w(xI -1 +  P-1  -  P, -2)  +  (1  -  )E,  [tp, 
+  (1  -  [)(e,  +  p,*)  +  4yj. 
Assuming again that p*  =  u  =  0, the pegged exchange  rate model con- 
sisting of equations 4-6 and A 13 can be reduced to the following second- 
order difference equation in p,  which I assume to be stable: 
[1 -  2w +  (1-w)0  L 
1 -  (1  -  0)(1  -  w)([j  -  ?8) 
(A14)  ~  ~~  1-(I-0)(1  -  wX)([t - <>8)  L]P 
_  (1  -  0)(1  -  w)(1  -  pt +  +8)e, 
1  -  (1  -  0)(1  -  w)([j  -  58) 
The  plot  for figure  12 was  generated  by  letting  p_ 1  =  -  100 and po  =  0, 
setting e,  =  0 for t  ,  0  and using (A 14) to generate p, for t -  1. 196  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
APPENDIX  B 
U.S.  Intervention  Sales  of  Yen 
THIS APPENDIX lists  U.S.  intervention  sales  of  yen  against  dollars, 
January 1993-April 1995:113 
Related Japanese 
U.S.  intervention date  Coordination  intervention in Tokyo 
1993: April 27  Yes  Nothing significant until 
May 26 
May 27  No  May 27-June 4 
May 28  No  May 27-June 4 
June 8  No  June 8, 10-17 
August 19  Yes  August 20-September  2 
1994: April 29  No  May 2 (next business  day) 
May4  Yes  May 6, 11, 13, 18-20 
June 24  Yes  June 27-29,  July 1 
November  2  Yes  November  1-2 
November  3  No  None reported 
1995: March 2  No  None reported 
March 3  Yes  March 3, 6-7 
April 3  Yes  Tokyo intervention con- 
ducted in concert with 
United States, continued 
April 4 by Bank of Japan 
alone 
April5  Yes  April 6-7,  10-11,  14, 17-20 
113.  Episodes  of U.S.  intervention other than March-April  1995 are reported in the 
Federal Reserve Bulletin, which identifies those that were coordinated with foreign central 
banks; March-April  1995 interventions were reported in the New} York  Times. Information 
on Bank of Japan intervention comes from Nihon Keizai Shinbun, Tokyo. Comments 
and Discussion 
Rudiger Dornbusch:  It is a great pleasure to discuss this paper. It takes 
a moderate,  mature,  insightful approach to  the knowledge  about ex- 
change rates, and it serves a great purpose in using a Swiss Army knife 
perspective,  opening a blade at the time,  telling you what you can do 
with it. There are forty-eight or forty-nine blades. 
The paper is eminently readable. In that literature, this is not always 
the case; in fact, almost never. And it does not defend the latest eleven 
articles of the author, which is even more rare. Moreover it comes down 
squarely where it should, which, for me, makes it particularly readable. 
So, it admirably serves  the purpose of looking back and asking, "What 
is there? What should you know? Where are the questions?" 
It says,  "Careful, this is not an area where we have had a Copernican 
revolution that gives us a radically new way of looking at results, closing 
all outstanding issues definitively. The issues were raised fifty years ago 
or longer, seventy  years ago; and the same issues  are still being kicked 
around, along with some  new puzzles.  We are doing a lot of work on 
them. We will report back in twenty-five years." 
That is one approach. It also says,  "We have been working on that 
and we are, actually, getting quite a bit ahead. We know a lot more about 
what is going on." 
Obstfeld follows  both tracks very,  very well.  He  leans over,  as he 
must, a little bit toward the current rendition of his themes.  Bolero has 
been enacted in eleven  movies by now, and each moviemaker gives his 
or her own touch to it. And Obstfeld, as his generation must, puts a lot 
of emphasis on credibility, and forward looking, and maximization, and 
tries those themes. Importantly, he comes out against them but does not 
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claim too much for the fact, and that means this paper will last longer in 
the end. 
Let me pick on a few issues  in the paper and then ask how it scores 
on the great question. Pick is the wrong word because  mostly I go along 
with Obstfeld; I want to highlight some issues. 
He says that PPP is a good benchmark. No  serious economist  could 
stray very  far from it as the anchor for an exchange  rate discussion. 
Why? Because  there are very large, cumulative price movement  diver- 
gences across countries. The exchange rate will mostly offset that. Since 
Cassel,  this has been the first thing to say. 
The next is to ask just exactly how well it works. Obstfeld argues that 
it sort of works, and that there are residuals. The residuals in annual av- 
erages always look small, and as Obstfeld does point out, when one cu- 
mulates them, they are big. Japan over the past hundred years is a case 
in point, with some 300 percent real appreciation. The trends are really 
quite big. And on that long-term trend line,  the yen  is approximately 
where  it should  be  right now  and it does  not  make  much  difference 
whether it is at 70 or 90 yen to the dollar. In the end, it will return to the 
trend; and twenty years from now will probably be 25 yen to the dollar. 
But the trend is not the whole story because  there is the extra effect 
of changing from a fixed rate regime to a flexible regime. For example, 
from the 1960s to the 1970s one observes  a very big yen real appreciation 
and a DM real appreciation,  one-time  moves  that come  with the tran- 
sition. 
So the question remains: Why are major realignments associated with 
regime changes,  as if these  changes  forced  a generalized  repricing of 
things and with that, a major change in relative prices? This issue tends 
to get lost when we consider  PPP and the trends.  Moreover,  the one- 
time jump deserves  special  attention.  What exactly  is the mechanism 
that gives  us PPP? And, is the pricing story regime-dependent,  so that 
tradable goods prices behave differently under fixed and flexible rates? 
That remains an issue for research. It certainly has a bearing on that 
nice natural experiment  of going from fixed to flexible rates.  Obstfeld 
draws attention  to the change  in the volatility  of real exchange  rates 
when  they  change  from fixed to flexible.  Another  question  is,  "How 
does a one-time,  big, real exchange rate change happen?" 
Obstfeld also looks  into the relation between  current accounts  and 
real exchange  rates. He points out that there really is no direct relation Maurice Obstfeld  199 
and that a simple forward-looking theory of current accounts  popping 
out of intertemporal optimization reflecting saving and investment deci- 
sions does not work very well, except in Sweden and maybe somewhere 
else. 
That is an interesting observation.  What is so special about Sweden? 
The immediate response,  of course,  is: "Ah well, they had special kinds 
of shocks." But perhaps the more basic point is that Sweden is the quint- 
essential welfare state, having only recently opened its capital markets. 
So  maybe  optimizing,  forward-looking  models  work well  for welfare 
states and not for capitalist market economies.  I would like to see a little 
bit more investigation of why Sweden,  of all places,  should be the case 
that works.  On the general question  of current accounts  and real ex- 
change  rates,  Obstfeld has the right answer.  You  have to look  at the 
shocks,  and you have to look at the institutions in which the optimizing 
happens,  but all said and done,  the claim that there may be a hope for 
optimizing, forward-looking models is probably exaggerated. 
Obstfeld,  in passing,  flirts with large world public debts.  He  says: 
"Well, I don't really know how this is connected  with exchange  rates. 
Surely there has got to be a connection.  Because  public debts are so big 
and are getting bigger, will they not get to the exchange rate, somehow, 
in the end?" 
He says:  "I am surprised that Italy keeps getting away with it." So, 
he is on to something. There is a link between  indebtedness  and the ex- 
change  rate; when  indebtedness  becomes  large,  people  look  toward 
Switzerland; and when they look toward Switzerland, the lira goes. 
Of course,  that is the story of a particular country that is relatively 
overindebted.  And that is the direction in which to look,  rather than at 
world debt. If we were to look at world debt and draw these charts for 
one hundred years, then perhaps it would not even be true that the world 
is relatively indebted today, unless we put in pensions.  Then, of course, 
Canada and Italy should have the really big depreciations  in their ex- 
change rates. 
Obstfeld  has  rightly included  all  the  Latin  and other  attempts  at 
exchange rate-based  stabilization under a general theme: Are exchange 
rates a panacea? The answer is no, they are not, neither fixed, nor flexi- 
ble, nor managed, nor target zone,  nor anything. Any kind of exchange 
rate regime has to be used prudently. Most of what matters is domestic 
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important part of Obstfeld's paper, and it is totally right in saying that the 
exchange  rate regime is not going to make a difference when domestic 
policies cannot be brought in line. 
He treads a little bit on dangerous territory when it comes to incomes 
policy.  He says that an incomes  policy can help, but this has to be fol- 
lowed by a colon,  and immediately alarm bells have to be rung, because 
virtually every  experiment with exchange  rate-based  stabilization has 
been complicated  by an incomes  policy that was not called off in time. 
Mexico is an example, with its pacto;  Chile in the 1970s is too; the early, 
unsuccessful  Israeli stabilization is another. In every one of these cases 
there was an incomes policy or indexation that in the end was politically 
very important and was not given up, and became the vehicle for over- 
valuation. 
Obstfeld  discusses  accommodation  and  exchange  rate policies  to 
conclude that the evidence about the persistence  of inflation under alter- 
native exchange  rate regimes is really very ambiguous.  I have trouble 
with that section  because  I do not really know that flexible exchange 
rates are the regimes of people who want loose  money; or that fixed ex- 
change rate regimes are for the tight money crowd. I can imagine a flex- 
ible exchange rate being adopted by a country that says,  "We want a re- 
ally powerful offset to domestic disturbances. We will not accommodate 
with money.  When we have a wage disturbance,  we get a tightening of 
money,  and higher interest rates, and real appreciation that will give us 
extra unemployment,  on top of what we would get in a fixed exchange 
rate." That is one mode. The other mode is, "We like to accommodate, 
and we don't want to think of external constraints. Let us have a flexible 
rate." Either one is a plausible story. Trying to see whether fixed or flex- 
ible exchange rates show up with more persistence  in inflation really has 
no theoretical basis. 
Let me come to my last issue: intervention.  Obstfeld, rightly, is very 
doubtful of the evidence  on intervention;  whether countries  intervene 
when the exchange rate is just about to turn and make a marginal differ- 
ence by getting the turning point between  Friday and Monday, claiming 
full credit; or whether, in fact, historic battles are fought and won by the 
intervening governments  against the speculators,  who  learn their les- 
son,  surrender, and for months  and months  afterwards speculate  the 
other way. 
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Bundesbank to come in and help them stabilize the lira before the 1992 
debacle.  Obstfeld is right in his skepticism. 
Let me move from the small points to the bigger question of exchange 
rates. It is reasonable  to ask four questions.  One is: What job  are ex- 
change rates expected  to do, and how well do they do them? 
That is a question that, actually,  we do not often ask. We implicitly 
have some notion that they are there to achieve  general equilibrium. Is 
that full employment? Is that containing current account imbalances? Is 
that keeping interest rates lower than they otherwise would be? It is left 
open. 
It does help to also ask how well they do their job. But unless I know 
what they are supposed to do, I cannot answer that question. I could ask 
the same question of long-term interest rates and the stock market, and 
then I would  answer  that they  allocate  resources  over  time.  The ex- 
change rate allocates  the international division of labor. Does  it do that 
particularly well? Compared to what? Compared to fixed rates? Com- 
pared to a world of flexible exchange rates with capital controls? 
The second  question is: What are the mechanisms  by which the ex- 
change rate accomplishes  its goal, meaning the international allocation 
of resources? A lot of the research about pricing and about the effects of 
exchange rates over time, including even research on direct investment, 
is directed toward answering it; and I would say that the exchange  rate 
does accomplish international reallocation of activity. In this respect,  it 
is highly effective;  there is no need to bring in elasticity pessimism. 
The  third question  is  this:  Are  there  major puzzles  about the  ex- 
change rate? And the answer is: You could not want for more, because 
virtually every aspect is wide open to question.  For example,  what de- 
termines exchange rates? Time series models are not a great help. Fun- 
damentals are not a great idea.  Anomalies  make it into print without 
question. 
Lastly, can you do better? Obstfeld goes into that discussion,  and he 
quite rightly concludes  that, with so much ignorance on the main issues 
and even on the details, this is not the place to rush to reform. He empha- 
sizes that exchange rates are part of the world trading system,  and that 
it is exceptionally  important to keep the system  open,  rather than re- 
sponding to misgivings about exchange rate outcomes  with protection. 
"Is there something that could improve the situation?" Obstfeld asks. 
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tions tax. If you believe  that short-term volatility translates into persis- 
tent swings in real prices or real exchange rates, which themselves  have 
relatively little to do with what you understand to be fundamentals,  try 
a Tobin tax. The Tobin tax may well produce more volatility in the short 
run, but that is all right because the short run then really does not matter 
much. What it does do is stabilize medium-term prices, and those are the 
ones that affect the allocation of resources. 
The second  option is to consider currency boards. Currency boards 
are the universal fad. Any time there is a collapse anywhere, people will 
say,  "Let's do currency boards." But even  when you have a currency 
board, you had better have 100 percent reserve banking and a balanced- 
budget amendment to get the Holy Trinity right. If you do not, you might 
end up like Argentina. 
The third, and most important, alternative is inflation targets. If we 
had inflation targets in the United States,  in particular, the movements 
in the dollar that we are seeing now would be far less likely. An explicit 
inflation target is really the missing anchor. If there is no anchor, then 
drift and volatility are to be expected. 
In summary, here is a really excellent  paper. It is exactly right in say- 
ing that this is the exchange  rate system  that we are going to live with; 
and any institutional changes will take place far away from the exchange 
market, presumably in the central bank. They will not be of the heroic 
kind that you talk about but never carry out, but they might be of the 
pragmatic kind, like inflation targets. And with inflation targets you are 
back to where the paper starts, at PPP trends. Inflation targets will limit 
the movements  of exchange rates. 
Ronald  McKinnon:  I  enjoyed  reading  Obstfeld's  paper  as  much  as 
Dornbusch did. It is encyclopedic,  and it is a balanced account of what 
we  know  about the foreign  exchanges.  It is a nice  paper to assign  to 
students to get them up to speed. 
The summary idea, which goes  through to Obstfeld's  conclusion,  is 
that the floating exchange rate system has not been the horror show that 
Ragnar Nurkse-and  other  economists  favoring  Bretton  Woods  par 
values-projected  from the experiences  of the 1920s and 1930s. But nei- 
ther has it been the smooth adjustment mechanism that eminent advo- 
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son,  and  Fritz  Machlup-projected  in  the  1950s  and  1960s  when 
exchange rates were safely fixed. Obstfeld's  empirics gives us a handle 
on how  the current regime is both more volatile  and less  satisfactory 
than projected by floating enthusiasts at that time. 
In the  1960s, one idea united Keynesians  and monetarists: they did 
not like the fixed-rate dollar standard. Many in both camps-albeit  for 
different reasons-wanted  the national macroeonomic  autonomy  that 
floating promised to confer. Consequently,  by the end of the 1960s, the 
intellectual defence of the fixed-rate dollar standard-arguably  the most 
successful  international monetary system the world has yet seen-was 
undermined. 
Let me identify just two points of disagreement with Obstfeld's com- 
prehensive  paper. First is a sin of commission:  the general association 
of national monetary independence  with no-par floating. I will provide a 
counterexample.  Second is a sin of omission: ignoring how volatile long- 
term interest rates have become  since exchange rate par values were fi- 
nally terminated in 1973. 
The Syndrome of the Ever-higher  Yen 
First, Obstfeld suggests that under floating exchange  rates countries 
can choose  their own rate of inflation. He states that "by accommodat- 
ing long-run equilibrium movements  in real exchange  rates,  floating 
nominal exchange  rates have helped liberate countries to pursue their 
own inflation objectives."  Floating exchange rates have indeed allowed 
many countries  greater long-run monetary  independence-if  often  to 
their own detriment. In table 2, Obstfeld notes the strikingly higher and 
more persistent inflation in developing countries since floating began. 
More questionably,  he applies this principle to Japan in particular. 
"Given Japan's recently revealed preference for lower consumer-price 
inflation,  however,  the  yen's  continuing  trend  of  real  appreciation 
against the dollar could not have taken place at a fixed dollar-yen rate 
without substantial U.S.  deflation." 
This seemingly plausible conclusion  comes from Obstfeld's  analysis 
of the Balassa-Samuelson  effect.  Because  of higher productivity growth 
in Japan's manufacturing (tradable) sector relative to the United States, 
1.  McKinnon (1993). 204  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
Japan's CPI rises relative  to its wholesale  price index (WPI) by more 
than in the United States. Hence the only way that Japan could stabilize 
its CPI inflation at the same rate as that of the United  States is for the 
yen to appreciate continually against the dollar. 
This is all well and good.  But does  the ever-rising yen really reflect 
the revealed  preference  of the Bank of Japan to stabilize the CPI-as 
Obstfeld would have it? In Japan's famous era of rapid economic growth 
in the 1950s and 1960s when exchange rates were fixed, the Bank of Ja- 
pan was quite content to let the CPI increase at 4 to 5 percent per year, 
while the WPI rose by about 1 percent per year. However,  since  1985, 
when American CPI inflation became fairly modest, further yen appreci- 
ation has resulted in a falling WPI in Japan. Indeed, particularly sharp 
yen appreciations  in 1985-86 and 1993-95 provoked  two industrial re- 
cessions.  These  costly  high-yen deflations hardly seem like conscious 
policy by the Bank of Japan to eliminate inflation in Japan's CPI. I would 
argue that over the last decade,  the ever-higher yen has forced the Bank 
of Japan into absolute deflation that it does not want; and, indeed, can- 
not get out of. 
Even taking a longer-term perspective,  the rise of the yen from 360 to 
the dollar in early 1971 to less than 100 in 1995 has imposed relative  de- 
flation on Japan compared to the United States. Increases in the foreign 
exchange  value of the yen force the Bank of Japan to be more deflation- 
ary and, in effect,  to validate the yen's  appreciation.  Whence  the syn- 
drome of the ever-higher yen. 
What  is  the  mechanism  behind  this  syndrome?  When  President 
Nixon  slammed the gold window shut in August 1971, he imposed an im- 
port surcharge on goods  coming  into the American  economy  and de- 
manded that trading partners appreciate the dollar value of their curren- 
cies  before  the  surcharge  would  be  removed.  Because  of  Japan's 
persistent  trade surpluses  since  then,  the United  States  continued  to 
couple protectionist threats with demands-either  implicit or explicit- 
for yen appreciation. (The major exception  was the strong-dollar policy 
of the first Reagan administration.) 
All the way from 360 to less  than 100 yen to the dollar, U.S.  secre- 
taries of the Treasury have opined that the dollar is too high-notably 
Michael Blumenthal in 1977, James Baker in 1985-87,  and Lloyd Bent- 
sen in 1993. Often these  attempts to "talk" the dollar down have been 
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nese  to open or share this or that market. Taking a short-run view  of 
what would improve American competitiveness  vis-a-vis Japan, partici- 
pants in the foreign exchange market see a lower dollar as way of amelio- 
rating-or  perhaps forestalling-protectionist  threats from the United 
States. For example, in particularly acrimonious negotiations in the first 
four months of 1995, when the U.S.  trade representative,  Mickey Kan- 
tor, tried to force Japan to set numerical targets for buying American 
automobiles  and automobile  components,  the  dollar fell  particularly 
sharply, from 100 to 80 yen, before partially recovering in May. 
But talk is cheap. Why should it force the yen up over the long term? 
Although the exchange  rate is a forward-looking  asset  price,  the (for- 
ward) fundamentals are hard to define, let alone model-either  by for- 
eign-exchange  traders or by econometricians-as  Obstfeld nicely  dis- 
cusses.  So  under  certain  circumstances,  talk  on  exchange  rates  by 
Treasury secretaries,  and commercial disputes themselves,  can have an 
impact. 
The  markets  see  that the Japanese  government  tolerates  a higher 
value of the yen in the short run because overvaluation  seems to relieve 
American mercantile pressure and threats of a trade war. The markets- 
although not the "populist" American government-have  also come to 
realize that yen appreciation will not itself reduce Japan's saving surplus 
as reflected in its current account  surplus. Thus after any one episode 
when the yen is run up, and the American government  is temporarily 
mollified,  they  project that the Japanese  current account  surplus and 
American current account deficit will continue in the future. Populist po- 
litical agitation in the United  States will eventually  reappear as people 
complain about "unfair" Japanese  competition,  the American govern- 
ment again threatens sanctions unless Japan "does something" about its 
trade surplus-and  the yen rises further as a palliative. In the longer run, 
deflation in Japan relative to the United States  sustains this erratic up- 
ward path of the yen. 
Once expectations  of an ever-higher yen are firmly in place in the fi- 
nancial markets, the Bank of Japan becomes  virtually powerless  to pre- 
vent deflation from occurring.  Take the present  situation in mid-1995. 
Purchasing power parity, conservatively  estimated  to align the whole- 
sale price levels of Japan and the United States, would be about 130 yen 
to the dollar, while the current exchange  rate is 85 yen to the dollar. At 
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a slump-and  the domestic  WPI is falling. The Bank of Japan has cut 
the discount rate to 1.0 percent, the interbank lending rate is about 1.35 
percent, and the prime lending rate is 2.38 percent. Japan is in a liquidity 
trap where nominal interest rates are bounded below by zero,  but real 
interest rates remain substantial because  of the anticipated fall in the 
price level and continuing rise of the yen into the distant future. 
Notice  that, with this expectations  structure in place, quite large for- 
eign exchange  interventions  by the Bank of Japan (such as those noted 
in Obstfeld' s appendix B) are ineffective-whether  or not they are steri- 
lized. In the mode of the Keynesian  liquidity trap, any new issues of in- 
side money  are simply absorbed  by bond holders,  causing  very  little 
change in domestic  interest rates or-in  an open economy-in  the ex- 
change rate. 
What are possible ways of cranking up aggregate demand, eliminating 
slack,  and restoring normal output growth in the Japanese  economy? 
One unsatisfactory  way, used in 1986-87 when the yen was overvalued 
and nominal interest rates were also very low, is to create asset bubbles 
in stocks  and real estate.  Because  capitalization rates for dividend and 
rental streams are so low,  the Japanese economy  is prone to asset bub- 
bles anyway.  Wealth effects  from spiraling stock and real estate prices 
can increase  private spending-until  the inevitable  crash occurs,  as it 
did in Japan in 1990-91. Creating a bubble economy is only feasible once 
in a generation. 
A second  unsatisfactory  way is more quintessentially  Keynesian:  a 
fiscal expansion  with  sharply increased  government  deficit  spending. 
The problem here is twofold.  Public sector investment  spending has al- 
ready increased sharply in Japan. Secondly,  building sharp increases in 
current consumption-public  or private-into  the financial structure is 
inconsistent  with  Japan's  rapidly  aging  population.  (Moreover,  the 
United States currently depends on Japanese saving!) 
Neither  the bubble method nor fiscal expansion  will do much to re- 
duce the yen's  overvaluation.  Clearly, the only satisfactory way out to 
break the syndrome of the ever-higher yen is to convince  the markets 
that the yen is unlikely to appreciate in the future. And the most straight- 
forward way of changing expectations  would be to announce a monetary 
pact between  Japan and the United  States  that stabilizes  the common 
producer  price  level  and  fixes  the  yen-dollar  exchange  rate  indefi- 
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Figure  Dl.  Volatility  in Long-term  Interest  Rates, United  States  and United  Kingdom 
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a narrow  zone of variation  around  it. This is spelled out in some detail 
by Kenichi  Ohno  and myself.  2 
In effect, we have a 1930s-type  problem  of a beggar-thy-neighbor  ex- 
change  rate  policy-as  reflected  in the syndrome  of the ever-higher  yen. 
And the solution now, as then, is a mutually  determined  par-value  sys- 
tem credibly  anchored  by a common  monetary  policy. On this, Obstfeld 
and I seem to differ-with  him remaining  agnostic on what reforms  are 
feasible or desirable. 
Volatility in Long-term Interest Rates 
Obstfeld  is very good at looking at different  kinds of volatility since 
the fixed-rate  dollar standard  broke down, and illustrating  the big in- 
crease in real  exchange  rate  volatility  and  domestic  price  volatility  under 
floating.  But one important  dimension  of volatility  that he left out is the 
behavior  of interest  rates. 
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Although I do not have the space here to analyze why interest rates 
have become more volatile since floating began, figure DI compares the 
behavior of long-term interest  rates for Britain and the United  States 
under the international gold standard (1879-1913),  the fixed rate dollar 
standard (1950 to  1970), and floating exchange  rates (1973-94).3 Prime 
AAA railway bonds were used for the United States under the gold stan- 
dard; otherwise,  the longest-term government bonds were employed for 
each country in each period. 
Comparing mean  absolute  monthly  changes  in percentages  points 
(using annual changes  makes  no difference  to the results),  long-term 
interest rates were nine to ten times as volatile under floating as under 
the gold standard, and three to four times as volatile as under the fixed- 
rate dollar standard. And this much higher volatility in the floating-rate 
period does  not merely reflect the worldwide inflation of the 1970s and 
deflation of the early 1980s. When the data are broken down into sub- 
periods,  and other countries  included,  they  show  that high long-term 
volatility in long-term interest rates in the advanced industrial countries 
has continued into the 1990s. 
General  Discussion 
The  Panel  discussed  several  aspects  of  exchange  rate  volatility. 
Barry Bosworth observed that international product markets react only 
slowly to changes in exchange rates, making the price elasticities  of ex- 
port supply and import demand extremely  small in the short run. This 
is true even for U.S.-Canadian  trade, where there are no formal trade 
barriers. With such a slow response  in the trade flows that respond to 
moderate exchange  rate movements,  he reasoned  that exchange  rates 
can drift and fluctuate as if there were  no fundamentals driving them. 
Bosworth also found it puzzling that price elasticities  have not increased 
with the expansion of trade and the reduction of trade barriers. 
Jeffrey Frankel provided an argument that the comovement  between 
exchange rates is not just chance. The residuals of equations for the yen- 
dollar and DM-dollar exchange  rates are highly correlated, producing a 
3.  See McKinnon (forthcoming) for an analysis of interest rate volatility under float- 
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coefficient of 0.7 in Dornbusch's  regression relating monthly changes in 
the DM-dollar rate and the yen-dollar rate. In a world where the vari- 
ances of the shocks affecting the three currencies are equal and the co- 
variance of these shocks is 0, the regression coefficient would be 1/2. It 
is impossible  to say, however,  whether Dornbusch's  higher coefficient 
is due to excessive  volatility and contagion, or to correlation among fun- 
damentals.  William Brainard pointed out that this evidence,  and all of 
the paper's evidence,  on volatility concerns the exchange  rate between 
two specific currencies.  But for macroeconomic  stability, the volatility 
of a general index of a currency's value is more relevant. 
Greg Mankiw was puzzled by the finding that exchange rates, but not 
fundamentals like output and money,  have become  more volatile under 
the floating regime. This defies most models and implies that the volatil- 
ity  of  exchange  rates  does  not  affect  anything  else.  In  response, 
Obstfeld  expressed  skepticism  about  some  popular empirical models 
linking exchange  rates and fundamentals.  For one thing, he questioned 
whether we have pinned down the fundamentals behind the exchange 
rate. Ml,  M2, and the like are endogenous  variables, not true fundamen- 
tals. For another, we do not know the true stochastic process behind the 
fundamentals.  The effect expected  on the exchange  rate from a money 
shock depends  on whether money growth has a unit root.  Even  if the 
stochastic process changed subtly with regimes, exchange rate volatility 
might change dramatically. Finally, the increased exchange rate volatil- 
ity observed  under floating may reflect the fact that capital mobility in- 
creased during the floating rate period, and this increased mobility could 
affect volatility independently of other fundamentals. 
Brainard suggested  that the welfare  effect  of exchange  rate move- 
ments depends  on the extent  to which speculation  is a socially  unpro- 
ductive activity with negative externalities,  and on what allocative  role 
the exchange  rate plays.  In particular, the importance of volatility de- 
pends on whether it interferes with the market's role in allocating long- 
term investments.  Obstfeld reasoned  that exchange  rate volatility  re- 
sults in greater variance in many sources  of income and wealth,  which 
will lead to a welfare loss if this cannot be hedged away.  He suggested 
that the importance of this effect is similar to the importance of macro- 
economic  stabilization.  Brainard and Sims were more pessimistic  than 
Obstfeld about opportunities  for risk sharing. The opening  of capital 
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can case  indicates,  it can increase  risk as well.  Where speculative  at- 
tacks are possible,  where questions  of fiscal responsibility  make them 
likely,  and where  individuals  are not fully  hedged  with  international 
portfolios, opening up capital markets increases the risk that individuals 
are exposed  to.  Brainard pointed  out that the Shiller financial instru- 
ments,  which  Obstfeld  offered  as  candidates  for  hedging  individual 
workers' exchange rate exposure,  remain theoretical.  But if they did ex- 
ist,  they would  still provide highly imperfect hedges  because  the bur- 
dens of adjustment are not shared equally, even by workers in the same 
plant. Since General Motors fires individual employees  rather than re- 
ducing everyone's  work hours, it does not help any worker very much 
to own a share of Japan's GNP. 
Several policy proposals were discussed.  Sims questioned whether a 
Tobin tax on currency transactions  would decrease  volatility.  The tax 
should reduce the number of transactions,  and there is a correlation be- 
tween transactions and price volatility. But he doubted that this reflects 
a structural relationship. If volatility is due to speculation,  and if specu- 
lative attacks resemble bank runs, a Tobin tax can be viewed as a tax on 
deposits and withdrawals. This would make the "cash flow" more lumpy 
and might make runs more  sudden  and dramatic,  but it was  unclear 
whether it would reduce their importance. Robert Hall suggested using 
the exchange  rate as the intermediate target for stabilization policy.  He 
noted that the central banks of the United States,  Germany, and Japan 
use short-term interest rates as an intermediate target to be adjusted to 
meet macroeconomic  goals,  and that this results in relatively  high ex- 
change rate volatility.  He reasoned that targeting the rate of change of a 
crawling exchange rate peg, would yield a better combination of interest 
rate and exchange  rate volatility  than the current system  does.  Ralph 
Bryant  commented  that  policy  coordination  among  major countries 
would be useful and might be taken more seriously than it has been if we 
could improve our analytical understanding of the world economy  and 
of the spillovers from national macroeconomic  policies. 
William Nordhaus drew a broad message from the Mexican debacle. 
He noted that on that occasion,  and during other crises with a fixed ex- 
change rate system,  like when the EMS broke down,  there have been 
large  international  repercussions,  and  policymakers  have  gotten 
alarmed about a "systemic  crisis." By contrast,  even  large movements 
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Thus the choice of a fixed regime which cannot be maintained creates a 
negative international externality.  On the other hand, James Duesenb- 
erry commented that the fixed exchange  rate between  the French franc 
and the franc zone currencies in Africa worked fairly well as a nominal 
anchor for the franc zone countries,  containing inflation for over forty 
years. But Obstfeld questioned  whether the fixed exchange  rates alone 
accounted for this success,  noting that France exercised  a great deal of 
control over domestic fiscal and monetary policy of the African nations 
in the zone,  and provided them with substantial income transfers. 212  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
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